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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy is the principal device by which failing businesses
and financially-troubled families get one last chance to reorganize
their affairs back to financial health. It is also the graveyard for
business failures, the place where we bury dead corporations and
divide their remaining assets among their surviving creditors.
In the last decade, the bankruptcy system has given seven
million middle-class families a way to start over-an opportunity to
save their homes from foreclosure, rid themselves of overwhelming
debts, and reintegrate themselves into the workforce as productive
citizens. It has also been the way that 10,000 corporations have
restructured their way from failure to health, avoiding the disruptive
costs of dissolution and liquidation and instead preserving jobs,
stabilizing community tax bases, and fueling the longest period of
economic expansion in United States history. Another 100,000 less
fortunate corporations have had their funerals in bankruptcy, as their
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creditors have divided their assets and facilitated the redistribution of
capital and labor resources that must accompany liquidation.
Bankruptcy is the safety valve in America's capitalist system:
technical and arcane, but so important. For the last 100 years,
bankruptcy has functioned efficiently, providing a vital lubricant at
the rough edges of the American economy. We do not expect indi-
viduals to live life without hope and force them into the underground
economy to avoid a mountain of debt. Nor do we discourage entrepre-
neurs from starting new ventures by holding them personally liable if
that corporate venture fails. Instead, we give each individual and
business person a fair chance to start over. This second chance breeds
innovation and risk taking that puts the United States at the cutting
edge of technological and scientific development.
When our corporations experience liquidity problems, we do
not allow lenders to shut them down and break them up. Rather, we
permit sick businesses to file under chapter 11 to provide a breathing
spell to rehabilitate themselves; if rehabilitation cannot be accom-
plished, we provide a forum for liquidation of the businesses for the
collective good of all creditors.
At a time when the economies of Europe and Asia are moving
toward an American-style bankruptcy system, an ironic twist has
taken place in the United States. In cases concerning gambling rights
on Indian territory, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and trademarks
and the value of patents, the United States Supreme Court inadver-
tently has thrown the bankruptcy system into upheaval. As the shock
wave of the cases reverberates, the bankruptcy system threatens to
shake apart at its core, at least in those cases in which a state is
involved.,
The premise behind bankruptcy is that efficiency can be
accomplished with aggressively enforced collective action. All of a
debtor's problems are dealt with in a single case in a single court.
The rules of the court are clear, and unless creditors agree otherwise,
they will have rights determined according to a strict priority
scheme-secured creditors ahead of unsecured creditors, employees
ahead of taxing authorities, and trustees ahead of creditors. If there
is any chance to save the business, all creditors will be forced to hold
off in their collection actions, while they have predetermined rights to
1. The severity of this threat has not been the subject of an empirical study. However,
the few reported decisions hint at the magnitude of state abuse that occurs in numerous other
cases. See, e.g., infra notes 147-55.
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shape (or even stop) the company's efforts to reorganize.2 Although
unsecured creditors often must be satisfied with only pennies on the
dollar for what they are owed, they can draw comfort from one fact:
every other general unsecured creditor of the debtor is in exactly the
same boat.
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided a case that ended that
certainty as it applies to states and the involvement of states in
bankruptcy cases. Three years later, it is apparent that although
some states are complying with traditionally held notions of bank-
ruptcy law, other states are defying bankruptcy law by seizing money
or property of a bankrupt business or individual. When bankrupt
debtors try to sue states in bankruptcy court to remedy this defiance,
states rely on newly-minted Supreme Court jurisprudence to assert
the Eleventh Amendment as a defense to federal jurisdiction, ren-
dering the federal bankruptcy courts powerless to act.3
Not only does self-help allow the states to get more than their
fair share by jumping ahead of other creditors without regard to
statutory priorities, it also enables states to seize essential equipment
or assets that can cripple the ability of a business to reorganize. As
one court noted:
Our national bankruptcy system, in which Congress intended debtors to retain
the opportunity to reorganize and to obtain a fresh start, may be in grave dan-
ger if the states cannot be bound by orders issued by the federal courts under
bankruptcy law.
4
2. In a chapter 11 reorganization case, the automatic stay enjoins most creditors from
commencing or continuing litigation or other debt collection activities against the debtor or its
property. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994). Creditors may shape the reorganization case by
negotiating their treatment under a plan of reorganization. If a plan impairs creditors' rights,
the affected creditors have the right to vote to accept or reject the plan. See id. §§ 1124,
1129(a)(8). In order for a class of claims to accept the plan, 2/3 in dollar amount and a majority
in number of those voting must vote to accept the plan. See id. § 1126(c). The plan may be
confirmed consensually if it is accepted by all impaired classes. See id. § 1129(a)(8). If an
impaired class does not vote to accept the plan, contested confirmation is possible but difficult to
achieve. See id. § 1129(b). Creditors who oppose the plan or are antagonistic toward the debtor
may seek to dismiss the bankruptcy case or convert it to a liquidation case under chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code. See id. § 1112(b). Creditors also might seek to limit or condition the
operation of the business or seek the appointment of a trustee or examiner to exert control over
the reorganization case. See id. §§ 1104, 1108.
3. Nor, apparently, may a debtor now sue states in state courts without their consent.
See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999).
4. In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 843 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
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This dire pronouncement, made by Bankruptcy Judge Tice of
the Eastern District of Virginia, relates to the Supreme Court's 1996
decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, in which the Court stated that
Congress has no authority to abrogate a state's immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment by enacting legislation pursuant to an exercise
of the powers enumerated in Article I of the Constitution.- Although
the Seminole Tribe holding itself did not involve bankruptcy law, the
Court, in dictum, 6 and nearly every court and commentator that
subsequently have addressed the issue,7 interpreted the decision to
render unconstitutional section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,8 by
which Congress has attempted to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity in the context of bankruptcy cases. Abrogation enables a
bankruptcy court to hold states accountable under the Supremacy
Clause for compliance with the Bankruptcy Code, including violation
of the automatic stay or receipt of preferential or fraudulent trans-
fers. 9 In many cases, states are creditors based on regulatory claims,
such as permit and license fees and fines, tax claims, student loans,
unpaid alimony claims, small-business loans, and the like.1°  The
importance of the states' claims (and thus the importance of abroga-
tion) can'vary from case to case, but in a particular case, states now
may elect to act aggressively to seize money or property postpetition
in violation of the automatic stay or a discharge injunction. This
wrongful activity can advantage states with respect to other creditors,
can imperil the viability of a business as a going concern, and can
undermine the discharge and the debtor's fresh start.
As a result of Seminole Tribe, some states have felt free to
violate the myriad protections afforded to debtors and creditors by the
Bankruptcy Code and thereafter to assert the Eleventh Amendment
5. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71-72 (1996) (invalidating congressional
legislation promulgated under the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
6. See id. at 72 n.16; see also id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994). Thus far, the cases have addressed the unconstitutionality
of section 106(a) to the extent it abrogates sovereign immunity to subject states to suits in
federal courts. See, infra notes 102-11.
9. See, e.g., Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Mahern, 59 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated, Ohio
Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130, 1130 (1996); In re Shealy, 90 B.R.
176 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1988); In re Ellis, 66 B.R. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
10. "States play an important role in the bankruptcy process, appearing in many
bankruptcy cases in a myriad of roles-as priority tax creditor, secured creditor, unsecured
creditor, police and regulatory authority, environmental creditor, landlord, guarantor,
bondholder, leaseholder, and equity interest holder." NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMM'N
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT 20 YEARS 900 (1997).
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to avoid the enforcement of the federal statute by a bankruptcy court
or, indeed, by any federal court at all. In so doing, such states have
fulfilled a prophecy made by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit more than a decade ago:
[If] the federal courts were not able to order a state to turn over assets to a
bankruptcy estate, then any state owed money by a debtor having financial
problems would have a strong incentive to collect whatever funds it believed to
be due as rapidly as possible-even if this pushed the debtor into insolvency-
rather than risking the possibility of recovering only a portion of their debt in
any subsequent bankruptcy proceedings. In effect, we would be holding that
the Constitution makes a state a preferred creditor in every bankruptcy. The
very existence of this power would doubtless encourage other creditors to ac-
celerate their collections. The end result would be an increase in bankruptcies
and a distortion of the system of preferences that Congress has carefully
crafted."
Indeed, one bankruptcy court has concluded that, without the
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment provided by section 106(a),
"[t]he Bankruptcy Code would soon unravel and the Bankruptcy
Clause [of Article I of the Constitution] would be rendered meaning-
less."12
But the Supreme Court has not rested with Seminole Tribe.
Earlier this year, in three cases the Court dramatically disrupted the
balance of power between the states and the federal government. 13 In
one, Alden v. Maine, the Court held that the Constitution provided
states with the right to assert common law sovereign immunity in
state court as a defense to suits brought to enforce rights conferred by
Article I of the United States Constitution.14 In a second case, Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank, the Court held that congressional legislation that authorized
11. McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary of State (In re McVey Trucking, Inc.), 812 F.2d 311,
328 (7th Cir. 1987); see Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 109-
11 (1989) (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (agreeing with the analysis
in McVey); Employment Dev. Dep't v. Joseph (In re HPA Assocs.), 191 B.R. 167, 174 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1995) (same).
12. Stern v. Massachusetts Alcohol Beverage Control Comm'n (In re J.F.D. Enters.), 183
B.R. 342, 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). Examples of the unraveling of the Bankruptcy Code are
discussed infra notes 147-55.
13. See generally Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999)..
14. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
1532 [Vol. 52:1527
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suits against states for patent infringement was unconstitutional. 15
Last, the Court's decision in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board overturned the doctrine of
"implied" or constructive waiver of sovereign immunity.16 Each of
these cases concerns separate issues, but together they represent a
great shift in favor of states' rights. And with this shift comes a very
real apprehension of state abuse of federal rights in the bankruptcy
context.
Although these fears might be exaggerated,17 congressional
inability to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment and common
law sovereign immunity can lead to and has resulted in troubling
situations that are antithetical to some of the core purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code. Consider the case of the Tri-City Turf Club, a
horse racing facility in Kentucky. 18 After Tri-City filed a voluntary
petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the state unilaterally revoked Tri-City's license to conduct live horse
racing and intertrack wagering.9 In doing so, the state violated the
automatic stay of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,20 which
Congress has deemed to be "one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by the bankruptcy laws,"21 and deprived Tri-City of the
15. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2202; see also infra notes 276-85 and accompanying
text.
16. See College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228; see also infra notes 176-81 and accompany-
ing text.
17. Some states appear to have obeyed the bankruptcy laws despite the availability of
Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity to shield improper conduct. Perhaps this is due
to enlightened self-interest on the part of government officials in the executive branch who have
reputational concerns and must be accountable for their actions to the electorate in a political
arena. Some government officials might have concluded that the failure of a state to obey
federal bankruptcy law would provoke preemptive actions by other creditors to encumber,
attach, or seize the debtor's assets before bankruptcy. Indeed, if bankruptcy relief becomes
ineffective for debtors, they can be expected to resort to asset-backed securitization and other
forms of financing ex ante that will remove assets from the reach of the state. For example, a
state has little recourse against a debtor that leases all assets or has all valuable assets located
offshore. Full development of these second-order effects is beyond the scope of this Article.
18. Tri-City Turf Club, Inc. v. Kentucky Racing Comm'n (In re Tri-City Turf Club), 203
B.R. 617 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1996).
19. See id. at 618.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994); see generally James 0. Johnston, Jr., The Inequitable
Machinations f Section 362(a)(3): Rethinking Bankruptcy's Automatic Stay Over Intangible
Property Rights, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 690-96 (1992) (analyzing decisions regarding
governmental revocation of licenses and related rights). But see 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1994),
amended by Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 603, 112 Stat. 2681, 2886 (1998) (ambiguously exempting
governmental police or regulatory power from section 362(a)(3)).
21. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296.
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ability to reorganize its business operations. Tri-City thereafter
commenced an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against the
state to enjoin the state from violating the automatic stay.22 The
bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary proceeding, believing that
"[t]he inescapable conclusion.., is that the holding of Seminole Tribe
clearly undermines the jurisdictional basis of this action against the
defendant, Kentucky Racing Commission, and the members of the
Commission. The court simply lacks jurisdiction to entertain this
adversary proceeding.' '23 Tri-City therefore was unable to enforce one
of the Bankruptcy Code's "most fundamental debtor protections" in
the forum in which its bankruptcy case was pending.
Consider also the case of Harry and June Mitchell, who filed
chapter 7 bankruptcy cases and subsequently received a discharge of
more than $300,000 in back taxes owed to the State of California.24
After the Bankruptcy Court entered its discharge order, the state
commenced assessment proceedings with respect to the discharged
taxes, and the Mitchells thereafter commenced an adversary pro-
ceeding in federal bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability
of their tax debt and to recover damages based on the state's violation
of the Bankruptcy Court's discharge order.5 The Bankruptcy Court,
however, dismissed the Mitchells' complaint on the ground that the
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity deprived the court of jurisdic-
tion over the action, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the
Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed that determination.26 As a
consequence, the Mitchells were unable to receive the full benefit of
the fundamental "fresh start!' otherwise accorded to them by the
Bankruptcy Code.27
This Article explores policy concerns and legislative solutions
to determine whether there is any escape from the "inescapable
22. See In re Tri-City Turf Club, 203 B.R. at 618.
23. Id. at 620. To the extent the court thought it was powerless to grant prospective
injunctive relief, the opinion appears to be erroneous. The court probably could have issued a
prospective injunction against the responsible state official in accordance with Ex parte Young.
See infra Part IV.D.
24. See Mitchell v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 222 B.R. 877, 878-79
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); see also 11 U.S.C. § 727 (setting forth the discharge provisions).
25. See In re Mitchell, 222 B.R. at 878-79. The Mitchells did not seek prospective
injunctive relief against a named state official. See id. at 881 n.4.
26. See id. at 888.
27. Congress deemed the discharge to be "the heart of the fresh start provisions of the




conclusion" (in the words of the Tri-City court) seemingly demanded
by Seminole Tribe and exacerbated by Alden and its companion
decisions. For the reasons set forth below, the Eleventh Amendment,
as construed in Seminole Tribe, and common law sovereign immunity,
as construed in Alden, render unconstitutional section 106(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code to the extent Congress has purported to abrogate
state sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity in the
context of suits against states in bankruptcy courts. Moreover, Alden
has the effect of denying the vindication of bankruptcy rights in state
courts and federal courts alike. As a result, Seminole Tribe and Alden
have the effect of undermining a key purpose of the federal bank-
ruptcy laws by altering the priorities legislated by Congress to elevate
states to preferred positions relative to other creditors.28 The various
mechanisms that courts and commentators have proposed to circum-
vent or limit the effect of these decisions, as discussed below, are of
limited utility.29 Congress should consider enacting legislation that
ameliorates the effects of Seminole Tribe and Alden in order to level
the playing field on which states and other creditors find themselves
in bankruptcy cases.30 Without change, the system is likely to
crumble or, at a minimum, produce vastly different and inequitable
results in cases in which states take an active role. One greedy
governmental creditor can undo all the good for literally millions of
debtors, creditors, employees, and communities. The case law now
shows us that the only way to stop it is by congressional action-not
by relying on clever arguments in court. Because we are dealing with
a constitutional proscription, congressional options are limited, but
they are not nonexistent. Below, we consider fundamental policy
concerns and offer the best options available.
Part II of this Article briefly summarizes the history and
nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity and the common-law
doctrine of sovereign immunity and concludes with an examination of
Seminole Tribe, Alden, and the states' newly enshrined constitutional
sovereign immunity right. Part Ill examines the effect of constitu-
tional sovereign immunity on section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
28. For the law regarding priorities in bankruptcy cases, see 11 U.S.C. § 507(a). For the
numerous ways in which the federal bankruptcy laws apply to the states and other creditors,
see, for example, infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text. Readers who are unfamiliar with
bankruptcy law concepts like priorities are referred to GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF BANXRUPTCY LAW (4th ed. Supp. 1998).
29. See infra Part m.A-B.
30. See infra Part 1V.A-E.
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and Part IV reviews the various arguments that courts have consid-
ered regarding limitation of sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy
context. Finally, Part V considers and critiques legislation that
Congress possibly could enact to neutralize constitutional sovereign
immunity, which include (a) reenactment of an analog to section
106(a) under the guise of the Fourteenth Amendment; (b) creation of
an automatic prospective injunction against state officials with
respect to bankruptcy matters; (c) authorization of suits by the United
States trustee or private rights of action by bankruptcy estates and
their representatives on behalf of the United States; (d) disallowance
of state claims unless the state waives immunity; and (e) encourage-
ment of a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity through the
conditional receipt of federal funds.
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. Common-Law Sovereign Immunity and
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity flows from
the premise that the "King could do no wrong,"31 and in its most basic
form operates such that "the sovereign cannot be sued in [its] own
courts without [its] consent."32 Before Alden, however, such common
law sovereign immunity was not thought to be constitutionally
guaranteed33 As a result, until Seminole Tribe it appeared that the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution enabled Congress unilaterally
to waive or abrogate common law sovereign immunity for several
purposes, including enforcement of the Bankruptcy Code.34 Although
31. Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 76 (1988); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1963).
32. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152,- 153-54 (1868); Jaffe, supra note 34, at 1. The concept
of sovereign immunity in American jurisprudence is taken from the law in England that the
Crown could not be sued without consent in its own courts. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,
2247 (1999). By comparison, a voluntary grant of immunity by one sovereign to another
sovereign in the first sovereign's courts is considered a form of comity. See Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410, 416 (1979).
33. See Patricia L. Barsalou, Defining the Limits of Federal Court Jurisdiction Over States
in Bankruptcy Court, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 575, 580-81 (1997).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992) (dealing with
congressional waiver of federal sovereign immunity).
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Congress has power to waive federal sovereign immunity,35 it is less
clear whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity to subject a state to suit without its consent in federal or
state courts.3
6
Noting that the Constitution in its original form did not refer
to or purport to preserve state sovereign immunity, the Supreme
Court held in the 1793 decision of Chisholm v. Georgia37 that the
federal courts had jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution to
hear and determine actions by citizens of one state against another
state as a sovereign entity.38 The four judges who concurred in the
Chisholm decision each wrote a separate opinion, but the common
thread binding their judgments was the theory that Article III of the
Constitution "evidenced the states' surrender of sovereign immunity
as to those provisions extending jurisdiction over suits to which States
were parties. 39  The Chisholm decision, however, apparently pro-
duced such a great "shock of surprise" that the Eleventh Amendment
was proposed quickly and was ratified in about two years. 40
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State."'41 Under the Amendment, therefore, federal courts
lack jurisdiction over suits against non-consenting states. 42
By its plain language, the Eleventh Amendment does not
extend to suits against a state by its own citizens 43 or, arguably, to
suits based on federal-question jurisdiction (as opposed to diversity
35. See id.
36. See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
37. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
38. See Michael P. Kenny, Sovereign Immunity and the Rule of Law: Aspiring to a
Highest-Ranked View of the Eleventh Amendment, 1 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1992).
39. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1999). Two of the four Chisholm judges argued
a more extreme position-that state sovereign immunity was inconsistent with the principle of
popular sovereignty established by the Constitution. See id. at 2249-50 (citing Chisholm, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) at 454-58, 470-72).
40. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
42. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119-20 (1984); McKay v. Boyd Constr. Co., 769 F.2d 1084,
1086 (5th Cir. 1985).
43. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67-68 (1996).
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jurisdiction).44 Indeed, perhaps because there was no general federal
question jurisdiction in the district courts at the time,45 the Supreme
Court initially interpreted the Eleventh Amendment narrowly,
holding that its protection applied solely to actions based on diversity
jurisdiction.
46
However, in the 1880s, the Court implied that under the
Eleventh Amendment, a state could not be sued under federal
question jurisdiction by a citizen of another state. 47 Then, in its 1890
decision of Hans v. Louisiana, the Court broadened the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment by holding that its protections applied to cases
based on federal question jurisdiction filed by a citizen against the
citizen's own state.48 In effect, Hans went beyond the language of the
text and appeared to elevate the doctrine of common law sovereign
immunity to constitutional status through the Eleventh Amend-
ment.4
9
Since Hans, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its expansive
view of the Eleventh Amendment, holding repeatedly that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits not only suits against a state by
another state's citizen, but also suits against a state by its own
44. See id. at 110-11 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In precisely tracking the language in Article
III providing for citizen-state diversity jurisdiction, the text of the Amendment does, after all,
suggest to common sense that only the Diversity Clauses are being addressed.).
45. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (adopting, for the first time, federal-
question jurisdiction in 1875).
46. See United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809); John J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1889, 1968 (1983) ('The Marshall and Taney Courts read the eleventh amendment in the
narrowest possible way and in no instance applied it to cases other than those in which federal
jurisdiction depended solely upon party status.').
47. See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 506-08 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 69-71
(1886).
48. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). See generally Alan D. Cullison,
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers), 5
HOUS. L. REV. 1 (1967) (focusing on the importance of the source of the cause of action).
49. See also Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934). The Court made clear its
current view that the constitutional bar contained in the Eleventh Amendment is derived from
common-law sovereign immunity:
[W]e cannot... assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restric-
tions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional
provisions are postulates which limit and control.... There is.. . the postulate that
States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from
suits, without their consent, save where there has been a "surrender of this immunity in
the plan of the convention."
Id. (citations omitted).
1538
1999] STATE DEFIANCE 1539
citizens, even if the case involves only federal question jurisdiction.5o
The Court, however, occasionally has recognized various limitations
on the scope of the Eleventh Amendment,51 including, from 1989 until
the Seminole Tribe decision, the authority of Congress to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to an exercise of power
enumerated in Article I of the Constitution.52
50. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) ("ITMhe background
principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so
ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area... that is under the exclusive
control of the Federal Government."); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483
U.S. 468, 472 (1987) ("[T]he Court long ago held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen
from bringing suit against the citizen's own State in federal court, even though the express
terms of the Amendment refer only to suits by citizens of another State.").
The Court's prevailing interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is subject to much debate.
Indeed, four current Justices appear to favor an interpretation that would prevent application of
the Eleventh Amendment to cases based on federal-question jurisdiction and cases involving
suits against a state by its own citizens. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76-101 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 101-85 (Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Several recently
departed Justices shared similar views, see Welch, 483 U.S. at 496-521 (Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting), as do numerous commentators, see 13 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3524 n.186 (2d ed. Supp.
1995) (surveying commentary critical of the Court's current Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence). See also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that modem sovereign immunity doctrine depends on "some other constitu-
tional principle beyond the immediate text of the Eleventh Amendment!).
51. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep't of Bus.
Regulation, 496 U.S. 18, 27 (1990) (The Supreme Court has "repeatedly and without question
accepted jurisdiction to review issues of federal law arising in suits brought against States in
state court."); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)
(Eleventh Amendment applies only to states and state agencies and not to local governmental
entities); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 144-45 (1908) (federal courts have jurisdiction over a
suit against a state official for prospective injunctive relief); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 376-77, 430 (1821) (rejecting argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars the
Supreme Court's power on writ of error to review the judgment of a state court involving an
issue of federal law); infra notes 102-93 and accompanying text; see generally Kurt E.
Springmann, Comment & Legis. Rev., The Impact of Seminole on Intellectual Property
Infringement By State Actors: The Interaction of Article I, Article I, the Eleventh Amendment,
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 889, 892-94 (1997).
52. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (holding that the Commerce
Clause of Article I gives Congress the authority to render states 'liable in money damages in
federal court"). The Union Gas decision was the product of only a four-Justice plurality (Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens), with Justice White concurring only in the result.
Nevertheless, both before and after Union Gas, lower federal courts routinely held that
Congress in fact could abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to its
Article I authority. See, e.g., Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Mahern, 59 F.3d 630, 634-36 (7th Cir.
1995) ("[Tlhere was no constitutional basis for distinguishing between the plenary powers
accorded Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment and those accorded under Article I.")
vacated, Ohio Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130 (1996) (mem.);
Employment Dev. Dep't v. Joseph (In re HPA Assocs.), 191 B.R. 167, 172-74 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1995) ("Congress' plenary powers under Article I did empower it to abrogate sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause mandate to establish uniform bankruptcy laws.");
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
B. The Seminole Tribe Decision
In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
Congress's attempt to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,53 which was enacted
pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I of the Constitu-
tion.54 The Court, noting a "'due concern for the Eleventh Amend-
ment's role as an essential component of our constitutional struc-
ture," 55 held that Congress, acting under either the Commerce Clause
or the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I, could not abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity and require states to submit to a
federal court's order for mediation. Specifically, the Court reasoned
that "[tihe Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under
Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitu-
tional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."56
Seminole Tribe has been interpreted to stand for the proposi-
tion that no clause in Article I "bestows upon Congress the power to
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity."57 Seminole Tribe,
however, does not purport to render void, as a per se rule, any and all
attempts by Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Rather, under Seminole Tribe, a "simple but stringent" two-question
test applies to determinations whether Congress may abrogate state
immunity in a particular context: "first, whether Congress has
'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity;' and
second, whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of
McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary of State (In re McVey Trucking, Inc.), 812 F.2d 311, 314-23
(7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that "Congress may abrogate state immunity to suit pursuant to any
of its plenary powers," including the Bankruptcy Clause); Mather v. Oklahoma Employment
Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419, 425-26 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995);
Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Sparkman (In re York-Hannover Devs., Inc.), 190 B.R. 62, 65-66
(E.D.N.C. 1995) ("[It is clear that the states have ceded their sovereign immunity in the field of
bankruptcy law.'); Stern v. Massachusetts Alcohol Beverage Control Comm'n (In re J.F.D.
Enters.), 183 B.R. 342, 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995); Murray v. Withrow (In re PM-il Assocs.),
100 B.R. 940, 942 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Wayne Manor, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Welfare
(In re Wayne Manor, Inc.), 94 B.R. 240, 243-44 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
53. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA!), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
55. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996) (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S.
223, 227-28 (1989)).
56. Id. at 72-73.
57. In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 837 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); see Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 72-73. The Florida Prepaid case removes any doubt that Seminole Tribe was limited to
Commerce Clause legislation. "Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers... " Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1999).
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power,' "58 (which, after Seminole Tribe, may not be found within the
confines of Article I itself). Unless both prongs of the Seminole Tribe
test are satisfied, the congressional enactment will be insufficient to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
C. Alden v. Maine and the New Constitutional
Sovereign Immunity Principle
Until 1999, the Supreme Court, despite its expansive interpre-
tation of the Eleventh Amendment, did not elevate to constitutional
status a state's common law sovereign immunity to suits in state
court. Thus, it was thought that Congress had the power to abrogate
a state's sovereign immunity to further legislation enacted under
Article 1.59
In Alden v. Maine, the Supreme Court created a new principle
of constitutional sovereign immunity by holding that "the powers
delegated to Congress under Article I of the United States Constitu-
tion do not include the power to subject nonconsenting states to
private suits for damages in state courts."6 The plaintiffs in Alden
were probation officers employed by the State of Maine. They initially
brought suit in federal court alleging Maine had violated the overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), seeking compen-
sation and liquidated damages.61 The federal district court dismissed
the suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, reasoning that the
Seminole Tribe decision deprived the federal court of jurisdiction to
hear the suit. The plaintiffs then filed the same action in state court.
The trial judge dismissed the action pursuant to Maine's assertion of
sovereign immunity, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
constitutional issue.62
In concluding that Maine's state sovereign immunity barred
the suit, the Supreme Court based its decision on three key concepts.
First, the Constitution's structure and history, coupled with the
Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, establishes that
"the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
58. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
59. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.





sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today.., except as altered by the
plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments."63 The
majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, strived mightily to
prove that at the time the Constitution was ratified, the states
universally believed that immunity from suit was a key aspect of their
continuing vitality in the new government.6 From this concept
Justice Kennedy was able to conclude "that sovereign immunity
derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of
the original Constitution itself."
65
Second, the Court determined that neither the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, nor the powers delegated to Congress
under Article I authorizes Congress to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity. The Court reasoned that when "a State asserts its
immunity to suit, the question is not the primacy of federal law but
the implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the
constitutional sovereignty of the States."6
Third, according to the Alden majority, principles of federalism
favor constitutional sovereign immunity as a bar to federal legisla-
tion: "[i]n some ways, of course, a congressional power to authorize
suits against nonconsenting States in their own courts would be even
more offensive to state sovereignty than a power to authorize the
suits in a federal forum."
7
Alden is a flawed decision for at least four reasons. 68 First, the
majority premises its decision on the existence of the states' constitu-
63. Id. at 2246-47. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, focused on the purported
acknowledgement by the Founders that states could not be sued without their consent. See id.
at 2247.
64. See id. at 2247-49.
65. Id. at 2254. Alden makes clear that the principles of sovereign immunity that served
as a backdrop to the Eleventh Amendment are not restricted to only cases involving the
Eleventh Amendment. "While the constitutional principle of sovereign immunity does pose a
bar to federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States... this is not the only
structural basis of sovereign immunity in the constitutional design." Id. at 2255.
66. Id. at 2255-56. The Court also rejected appeals to the Necessary and Proper Clause as
'Incidental authority to subject States to private suits as a means of achieving objectives
otherwise within the scope of the enumerated powers." Id. at 2256. Yet as explained below, the
Court does not appear to extend this rule to the Spending Clause. See infra notes 354-56, and
accompanying text.
67. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
68. We also note the majority's questionable account of the history of sovereign immunity
at the time of the ratification of the Constitution and its conclusion that Chisholm was wrongly




tional right to sovereign immunity. The Constitution, except for the
Supremacy Clause, which supports the primacy of federal power, and
the Eleventh Amendment, which concerns federal court jurisdiction,
contains no mention nor hints of the existence of a constitutional
sovereign immunity.9 The majority implicitly concedes that the
Constitution does not expressly grant the right of sovereign immu-
nity; instead, "[t]his separate and distinct structural principle is not
directly related to the scope of the judicial power established by
Article III, but inheres in the system of federalism established by the
Constitution.."70 In essence, "Kennedy found a penumbra."
71
Second, by finding a new constitutional right to sovereign
immunity, the Supreme Court prospectively renders the Eleventh
Amendment irrelevant. Constitutional sovereign immunity in Alden
necessarily precludes suits both in federal and state courts. Justice
Kennedy attempted to explain why the Eleventh Amendment's
language is fairly limited: "Congress chose not to enact language
codifying the traditional understanding of sovereign immunity but
rather to address the specific provisions of the Constitution that had
raised concerns during the ratification debates and formed the basis
of the Chisholm decision.72 But the majority made no concerted effort
to analyze why the Eleventh Amendment is necessary if "sovereign
immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the
structure of the original Constitution itself. 73 If the Constitution was
always meant to guarantee a state's right to sovereign immunity to
suits both in state and federal court, then surely Chisholm was
wrongly decided and the Eleventh Amendment was surplus. Thus the
Court violated the ancient rule of construction: "[i]t cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without
effect."74
69. See Erwin Chemerinsky, High Court Wrongly Lets States Off the Hook, L.A. TIMES,
June 25, 1999, at B9.
70. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2255.
71. Molly Ivins, Hey, Watch Out! Those Supremes Are at it Again, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, June 29, 1999, at 11; see also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2219 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('The full reach of
[Seminole Tribe's] dramatic expansion of the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity is
unpredictable; its dimensions are defined only by the present majority's perception of
constitutional penumbras rather than constitutional text.').
72. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2251.
73. Id. at 2254.
74. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
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Third, Alden creates unnecessary and substantial constitu-
tional questions. 75 Under the Court's rationale, the Alden plaintiffs
have a federal right under the FLSA against the State of Maine for
money damages that cannot be enforced in any court. Alden therefore
violates the "general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal
right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded."7r The "right and remedy" principle, which has
deep roots in English law, 7 is particularly well-settled in American
law and as much inheres in the United States Constitution as does
the purported penumbral right of sovereign immunity.78
Moreover, leaving parties with private rights no remedy to
protect those rights opens the door for abuse by the states. 79 The
majority attempts to rebut this argument by noting certain limita-
tions on the exercise of sovereign immunity8o and by further stating:
"We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the
Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States.'' 8, But
reliance on a state's "good faith" is an unsettling justification. 82 As the
Court previously stated, "[i]f the Constitution provided no protection
against unbridled authority, all property rights would exist only at
the whim of the sovereign.",,
75. See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 697 (1982).
76. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *23).
77. See Ashby v. White, 87 Eng. Rep. 808, 815 (KIB. 1794).
78. Justice Souter noted in Alden that several of the states perceived the principle to be so
crucial that it was enshrined in state constitutions. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2293 n.42 (citing
the Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Kentucky and Tennessee, Constitutions); see also
Charles Fried, Supreme Court Folly, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1999, at A21 (in criticizing Alden,
Florida Prepaid, and College Savings Bank, Fried noted: "Patent and related protection is
proclaimed in the Constitution itself, and the Court did not deny that patent and trademark
laws bind the States. Its structural argument was just that the patent holders cannot sue states
to protect their rights. What kind of structure is that?'). Moreover, the Court's conclusion may
create a conflict with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See infra notes 243-53 and
accompanying text.
79. See Chemerinsky, supra note 69, at B9.
80. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266-68. We discuss these limitations in greater detail below.
See infra Part II.
81. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266.
82. "[It is implausible to claim that enforcement by a public authority without any
incentive beyond its general enforcement power will ever afford the private right a traditionally
adequate remedy." Id. at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2294 n.43.
83. Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. 670, 697 (1982).
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Fourth, Alden dramatically, and perhaps unknowingly in its
full ramifications,8 alters the balance of power to favor the states.
Under Alden, legislation that authorizes private parties to sue states
to enforce federal rights is unconstitutional. Yet the Supremacy
Clause requires the states to accept and enforce lawful federal
legislation. 85 One must ponder how lawful federal legislation, which
the FLSA undoubtedly is, can ever be enforced adequately? The
Court mentions the fact that the federal government itself can sue
states in violation of federal law,86 but as Justice Souter notes in
dissent, that supposed check against state abuse is likely illusory as a
practical matter. 7
Moreover, the Court concedes the principle that the Supremacy
Clause guarantees primacy of federal law but states that "[a]ppeal to
the Supremacy Clause alone merely raises the question whether a law
is a valid exercise of the national power."88 However, Alden's view of
the Supremacy Clause makes no sense when one considers the
purpose of the Ex parte Young doctrine,89 which Alden expressly
reaffirms and which permits suit in federal court against state
officials to enforce federal law9
84. The rule that the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review state court
decisions involving federal questions, enshrined in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 326 (1816), might fall in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions. Because the Court
interprets constitutional sovereignty to allow states to assert immunity to suits against it in
either state or federal court, it is not inconceivable for a state to waive immunity in state court
on a federal cause of action, obtain a favorable ruling and then assert immunity in an appeal to
the United States Supreme Court. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee is premised on Article Ills grant
of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to review state court decisions involving federal questions.
Yet Seminole Tribe and Alden make clear that the states did not surrender their sovereignty in
Article Im. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2253. Unless there is some other constitutional principle of
judicial review (which the majority may have to create) that trumps constitutional sovereign
immunity, the bar that Alden and Seminole Tribe support theoretically would prevent the Court
from reviewing state court decisions without state consent.
85. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2288 (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 2267.
87. See id. at 2293 (Souter, J., dissenting). "IThe allusion to enforcement of private rights
by the National Government is probably not much more than whimsy." Id.
88. Id. at 2255. The Court's authority for this statement is Alexander Hamilton's
analysis: "But it will not follow from [the Supremacy Clause] that acts of the larger society
which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary
authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land." THE FEDERALIST
NO. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). But Hamilton was concerned
with federal intrusion on areas of traditional state governing. In Holeu, Congress had acted
pursuant to its lawful powers under Article I.
89. See infra Part IV.D.
90. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2262-63.
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III. SEMINOLE TRIBE, ALDEN, AND SECTION 106
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that,
"[n]otwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign
immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set
forth in this section with respect to" various enumerated sections of
the Bankruptcy Code.91 Through section 106(a), Congress expressed
an unequivocal intent to abrogate state immunity92 Thus, under the
rubric of Seminole Tribe and Alden, the question is whether, in so
legislating, Congress acted within a valid exercise of its power.
A. Section 106(a) Is Unconstitutional as Applied to the States
In 1989, the Supreme Court held that former section 106(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code,93 the predecessor to current section 106(a), did
not express an unequivocal intent to abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to money judgments for bank-
ruptcy-related causes of action.94 As a result, Congress subsequently
enacted the current version of section 106(a) to make clear its
unequivocal intent to abrogate state immunity in bankruptcy matters.
Indeed, the legislative intent of section 106(a) is unequivocal: "[t]his
amendment expressly provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity by
governmental units with respect to monetary recoveries as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief."55 Courts considering the issue
therefore have held that Congress unequivocally intended to abrogate
state immunity through section 106(a), 96 and the statute accordingly
satisfies the first prong of the Seminole Tribe analysis.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1994). The Bankruptcy Code defines "governmental units" to
include the states. Id. § 101(27).
92. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
93. Former section 106(c), the predecessor to section 106(a), provided that, "notwith-
standing any assertion of sovereign immunity-(1) a provision of this title that contains
'creditor,' 'entity,' or 'governmental unit' applies to governmental units; and (2) a determination
by the court of an issue under such a provision binds governmental units." Id. § 106(c) (repealed
1994).
94. See Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 101-04 (1989).
95. 140 CONG. REC. H10766 (1994) (Judiciary Committee Chairman Jack Brooks
describing § 113 of H.R. 5116). Congress confused its own power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity with a state's "waiver" of its own immunity, but congressional intent to overturn
Hoffman v. Connecticut and abrogate state sovereign immunity is crystal clear.
96. See, e.g., Department of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Management Co. (In re Fernandez),
123 F.3d 241, 243 (5th Cir. 1997); Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d
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Whether Congress actually had the power to so act, however, is
a more difficult question. Congress clearly has the power to waive or
abrogate federal, foreign, or local sovereign immunity97 Prior to
Seminole Tribe, it also appeared that Congress had the power to
abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in the bankruptcy
context because (a) the Supreme Court consistently had held that
Congress could abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when
enacting legislation pursuant to the "Enforcement Clause" of the
Fourteenth Amendment;98 and (b) in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., a
plurality of the Court had held that Congress similarly could do so
when enacting legislation pursuant to its plenary powers under the
Commerce Clause of Article I.99 Indeed, following the Union Gas
decision and prior to Seminole Tribe, every lower court to consider the
issue had held that Congress had the power to abrogate state immu-
nity when enacting legislation pursuant to its plenary powers under
the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I of the Constitution,1°° and several
1140, 1145 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998); California Employment Dev.
Dep't v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 n.6 (9th Cir. 1996); Employment Dev.
Dep't v. Joseph (In re HPA Assocs.), 191 B.R. 167, 171-72 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); Wyoming Dep't
of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 209 B.R. 540, 549 (D. Wyo. 1997), affd, 143 F.3d 1387
(10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998); In re NVR, Inc., 206 B.R. 831, 837 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1997); Florida Dep't of Revenue v. Sparkman (In re York-Hannover Devs., Inc.), 190
B.R. 62, 65 (E.D.N.C. 1995); Mather v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern
Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419, 425-26 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995); Stern v. Massachusetts Alcohol
Beverage Control Comm'n (In re J.F.D. Enters.), 183 B.R. 342, 354 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
97. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-05 (1994); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
488 U.S. 428 (1989); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).
98. The Enforcement Clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5; see, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976).
99. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-23 (1989) (Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ.); see also id. at 45 (White, J., concurring without explanation in the
plurality's conclusion, but not concurring in its reasoning). The Commerce Clause provides that
"Congress shall have Power... [to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
100. See, e.g., Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Mahern, 59 F.3d 630, 634-36 (7th Cir. 1995),
vacated, Ohio Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130 (1996) (mem.)
("Tihere was no constitutional basis for distinguishing between the plenary powers accorded
Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment and those accorded under Article I."); In re HPA
Assocs., 191 B.R. at 172-74 ("Congress' plenary powers under Article I did empower it to
abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause mandate to establish uniform
bankruptcy laws."); In re York-Hannover Devs., Inc., 190 B.R. at 64-65 ("[lit is clear that the
states have ceded their sovereign immunity in the field of bankruptcy law."); In re Southern
Star Foods, 190 B.R. at 425-26; In re J.F.D. Enters., 183 B.R. at 354.
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courts had reached the same conclusion prior to the issuance of the
Union Gas opinion.1°1
In Seminole Tribe, however, the Supreme Court held that
Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause or the Indian
Commerce Clause of Article I to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity. As a result, since Seminole Tribe a significant majority of
courts, including all of the Courts of Appeals to consider the issue,102
have held that Congress may not abrogate state Eleventh Amendment
immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I of the
Constitution.103 Such courts have reasoned that congressional power
to enact legislation pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause is analogous
to and coextensive with its authority to enact legislation pursuant to
the Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause and that, as a
result, there is "no basis for treating its powers under the Bankruptcy
Clause any differently"1 4 from the explicated powers under the
Commerce Clause.10
5
Unfortunately, these courts are correct because there are no
logical bases to distinguish the Indian Commerce Clause from the
Bankruptcy Clause or other grants of Congressional power under
101. See, e.g., McVey Trucking v. Secretary of State (In re McVey Trucking, Inc.), 812 F.2d
311, 314-23 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that "Congress may abrogate state immunity to suit
pursuant to any of its plenary powers," including the Bankruptcy Clause); Murray v. Withrow
(In re PM-II Assocs.), 100 B.R. 940, 942 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Wayne Manor, Inc. v.
Department of Pub. Welfare (In re Wayne Manor, Inc.), 94 B.R. 240, 243-44 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1988); cf. WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1002 (1st Cir. 1988)
(declining to consider whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under the Bankruptcy Clause because of "the uncertainty that permeates the subject of
abrogation!).
102. See Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 243-
44 (3d Cir. 1998); Department of Transp. and Dev. v. PNL Management Co. (In re Fernandez),
123 F.3d 241, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1997), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1139 (5th Cir. 1997);
Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997); Aer-
Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Transp. (In re Aer-Aerotron, Inc.), 104 F.3d 677, 680-81 (4th Cir.
1997) ("[Plerhaps the handwriting is on the wall that the abrogation provisions of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act will suffer the same fate as the statutes involved in Seminole.'); Light v.
State Bar (In re Light), 87 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished disposition); In re NVR, L.P.,
206 B.R. 831, 838 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); Sparkman v. Florida Dep't of Revenue (In re York-
Hannover Devs., Inc.), 201 B.R. 137, 141 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996) (listing cases in which courts
have so held).
103. The Bankruptcy Clause provides that "[tihe Congress shall have Power... [t]o
establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
104. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 105 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment).
105. See In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d at 243; In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 244; In re
Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1145-46.
1548
STATE DEFIANCE
Article I of the Constitution. Indeed, even the Constitution's Framers
recognized that the Article I powers are "intimately connected"16 and
reflect the need to "escape the risks of economic balkanization."107
Moreover, both the majority and the dissent in Seminole Tribe
foreshadowed this conclusion. The dissent, for example, decried that
application of the Seminole Tribe reasoning "prevents Congress from
providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against states,
from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning
bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast
national economy."108 Rather than dispute that conclusion, the
majority readily agreed, but nevertheless professed to be uncon-
cerned:
[I]t has not been widely thought that the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or
copyright statutes abrogated the States' sovereign immunity.... Although the
copyright and bankruptcy laws have existed practically since our nation's in-
ception,... there is no established tradition in the lower federal courts of al-
lowing enforcement of those federal statutes against the States.10 9
In fact, following the issuance of Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari of the Merchants Grain decision, in which the
Seventh Circuit had concluded that section 106(a) represented a valid
exercise of power under the Bankruptcy Clause,11° and the Court
promptly vacated and remanded that decision "for further considera-
tion in light of Seminole Tribe."'
In defense of Seminole Tribe's rendering unconstitutional
Section 106(a), certain commentators opined that bankruptcy causes
of action against states could be resolved in state courts and that as a
result, Seminole Tribe would not have the catastrophic impact that
many believed it would have. Before Alden, these commentators were
106. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
107. In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 244.
108. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
109. Id. at 72 n.16 (emphasis added). Several bankruptcy courts have taken issue with the
Court's statement that there is no tradition of allowing enforcement of federal bankruptcy laws
against the states. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Vermont (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731, 736 (Bankr. D.
Vt. 1998) ("We, like every bankruptcy judge we know, regularly and routinely enforced
applicable bankruptcy law against the States prior to Seminole.'); Schulman v. California Water
State Resources Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358, 376 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
110. Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Mahern, 59 F.3d 630, 634-37 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated, Ohio
Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130 (1996) (mem.).
111. See Ohio Agric. Commodity Depositors Fund v. Mahern, 517 U.S. 1130, 1130 (1996).
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correct that federal question causes of action could be brought against
a state in state court without offending Eleventh Amendment
immunity. States cannot rely on the Eleventh Amendment immunity
to protect them against suits in their own court system.112 Moreover,
when states have waived sovereign immunity through statutes or
conduct, they clearly can be sued in state courts.13  Under the
prevailing pre-Alden view, 114 Congress could abrogate common-law
"sovereign immunity enjoyed by states in their own courts by legis-
lating pursuant to its Article I powers,"15 including, presumably, its
112. See Hilton v. South Carolina Public Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204-05 (1991) ("[A]s
we have stated on many occasions, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in state courts.").
113. Many states have elected to waive sovereign immunity with respect to proprietary, as
opposed to governmental, functions. For example, New York State has done so in section 8 of its
Court of Claims Act. See Miller v. New York, 467 N.E.2d 493, 496 (N.Y. 1984). If a debtor were
owed money by the State of New York based on a proprietary function, the debtor could sue the
state. See also 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8 (West Supp. 1998) ('The court [of claims] shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear... [a]ll c aims against the state for damages in cases sounding in
tort .... '. In all, it appears that thirty-four states have enacted statutes waiving sovereign
immunity in state courts, to some extent. See ALASKA STAT. 09.50.250 (Michie Supp. 1997);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-201 to -210 (Michie 1998);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4w 61(a) (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-1 (Michie 1998);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-1 (1993); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 505/8 (West Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 46-913 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45A.245 (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
38:2181 (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1510-A (West 1989 & Supp. 1997); MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-201(a) (Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6419 (West 1995);
MINN. STAT. § 3.751 (1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-45-1 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-1-404
(1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,301 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031 (Supp. 1997); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 491:8 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:13-3 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-23
(Michie 1990); N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8 (McKinney Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12-02 (1996);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.320 (Supp.
1996); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4651-1 (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-13.1-1 (1997); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-32-2, 21-32-10 (Michie 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(L) (Supp.
1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-5 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-69,11-70 (Michie 1995); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.010 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 14-2-4, 14-2-13 (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-39-104 (Michie 1997).
114. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 58 & n.273; Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Soverign Immunity
"Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 122-25 (1996). This view is "better" precisely because the
original doctrine of sovereign immunity was not so much about "whether the Crown or its agents
could be sued, but how." PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1002 (4th ed. 1996). Adoption of the contrary position, as in Alden, will
immunize states and their agents from retrospective suits in any forum and would encourage
state defiance of federal laws without accountability to any court.
115. In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 843 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). See Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356, 374-78 (1990). Only if the state court invokes a neutral rule of judicial administration
may it refuse to exercise its general jurisdiction against the state on a federal cause of action.
See id. To the extent state law of sovereign immunity reflects a substantive disagreement with
the extent to which governmental entities should be held liable for their constitutional
violations, that disagreement cannot override the dictates of federal law. The Howlett Court
was careful to note that it left open the question "whether Congress can require the States to
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powers under the Bankruptcy Clause. At least one lower court held
that section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code validly abrogated common
law sovereign immunity for actions against a state brought in state
CourtS.1 16
Indeed, the Court had held that the Supremacy Clause not
only provides state courts with jurisdiction over federal causes of
action, it also required state courts of general jurisdiction to exercise
such jurisdiction absent some other available federal forum.117 But to
say that a state court has subject matter jurisdictionls to resolve
federal causes of action is not to resolve whether Congress can
abrogate a state's immunity in its own courts with respect to those
actions.119 Seminole ducked the issue but noted in passing that "this
create a forum with the capacity to enforce federal statutory rights or to authorize service of
process on parties who would not otherwise be subject to the court's jurisdiction." Id. at 378.
116. See O'Brien v. Vermont (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731, 736-38 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998).
117. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 207 (1991) ("[When] a
federal statute does impose liability upon the States, the Supremacy Clause makes that statute
the law in every State, fully enforceable in state court.") (quoting Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367-68);
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); see also In re O'Brien, 216 B.R. at 736 ("[S]tates are bound by
federal law; they must comply with federal law; and federal law can ensure that they do."); In re
NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. at 843. Section 1334(b) of title 28, United States Code, the primary
bankruptcy jurisdiction statute, supports this point by providing that the federal courts "shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, some commentators have suggested that only states may determine whether to
provide jurisdiction in state courts of federal causes of action. See Karen Cordry, State
Governments in the Bankruptcy Courts After Seminole: Are They the New 800-Pound Gorillas,
28 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT 23, at A10 (May 14, 1996). Moreover, it is
doubtful that a state court would have jurisdiction over disputes relating to property of the
estate or other matters over which Congress has granted exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts,
such as in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e), which grants the federal district court exclusive jurisdiction over
property of the estate. See Scott P. Glauberman, Citizen Suits Against States: The Exclusive
Jurisdiction Dilemma, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 63, 99-100 (1997); Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign's Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REV.
685, 765 (1989); Monaghan, supra note 114, at 132. Thus, Congress should consider amending
section 1334(e) to grant state courts concurrent jurisdiction over property of the estate solely for
actions that cannot be brought in federal court without the state's consent.
118. Some courts have held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a court's subject matter
jurisdiction over the suit. See, e.g., Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1149 n.8 (9th Cir.
1984). The better view is that although sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, it is "not of the
same character as subject matter jurisdiction." In re Prairie Island Dakota Sioux, 21 F.3d 302,
304 (8th Cir. 1994); see infra note 182. When a state waives sovereign immunity, it confers
personal jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction on the court. See PEAKSolutions
Corp. v. State Dep't of Transp. (In re PEAKSolutions Corp.), 168 B.R. 918, 922 & n.10 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1994).
119. See Meltzer, supra note 114, at 57-60. Where a state deprives a person of property in
violation of federal law, the state court must provide relief, notwithstanding "the sovereign
immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts." Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 110
(1994) (tax refund case).
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Court is empowered to review a question of federal law arising from a
state-court decision where a State has consented to suit.'' 120
As a conceptual matter, where the state had not consented to
suit, Congress should be able to abrogate state sovereign immunity to
require vindication of federal causes of action in state courts. 12 1
Otherwise no forum would be available to vindicate state violations of
federal law, federal legislative power would be impotent to bind the
states, and the Supremacy Clause would be undercut severely.12
Despite these obvious concerns, the Supreme Court's decision
in Alden squarely decides the issue in favor of the states. Under
Alden, states may assert sovereign immunity to suit in their courts to
any cause of action arising under Article I. Congress's abrogation of
sovereign immunity in section 106(a), like its attempted abrogation in
the Fair Labor Standards Act, is unconstitutional as applied to a state
without its consent. Thus, while causes of action for money damages
granted under the Bankruptcy Code against a state are, in theory,
available, there is currently no forum in which to bring such bank-
ruptcy causes of action.
B. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court reaffirmed12 that
Congress constitutionally may abrogate state Eleventh Amendment
120. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996)
121. See Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1171-77 (1984); Meltzer, supra note 114, at 58; Louis E. Wolcher,
Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts
for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. REV. 189 (1981).
122. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 211 (1991) ("If a suit
against state officers is precluded in the national courts by the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution, and may be forbidden by a state to its court... an easy way is open to prevent
the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution .... ). Indeed one might speculate
whether state prosecutors and other officials will misbehave if they are immune from federal
review and liability. Prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young might not be sufficient
to remedy actions taken by state officials before injunctive relief is granted. Conceivably,
second order reputational and political pressures will operate to keep state officials obedient to
federal law. See supra note 17. Resorting to state courts to resolve complex bankruptcy issues
is inconsistent with concepts of federalism.
123. See Seminole Tribe, 514 U.S. at 59; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)
(recognizing congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under .the
Fourteenth Amendment). Recently the Court renewed this reaffirmation in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2206-07 (remedial
legislation waiving state sovereign immunity under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is
limited to cases where Congress identifies a pattern of state deprivation of constitutional
rights).
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immunity when legislating pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court reasoned that, since the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified by the states after the Eleventh Amendment was ratified,
federal legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment
constitutionally could "intrude upon the province of the Eleventh
Amendment."124
At least four bankruptcy courts and one district court have
seized upon this "exception" to the Eleventh Amendment to hold that
section 106(a) in fact is constitutional.15 The first such case was
Southern Star Foods, Inc.,126 in which a chapter 7 trustee brought an
adversary proceeding against a state agency to recover an unauthor-
ized postpetition transfer 27 of property of the estate and to equitably
subordinate the agency's claim against the debtor in priority of
distribution to claims of other creditors.128 After the state argued that
Congress lacked the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity and that section 106(a) was unconstitutional,129 the bankruptcy
court held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth AmendmentO enabled the trustee's action to proceed. Specifi-
cally, the court held that the exercise of "national legislative powers
under any of the provisions of Article I will usually (if not invariably)
124. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. Another basis to distinguish the Fourteenth
Amendment from Article I is that the Fourteenth Amendment is of limited scope and was
intended specifically to alter the relationship between states and the federal government. See
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454-55.
125. See Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 209 B.R. 540, 555 (D. Wyo.
1997), affd, 143 F.3d 1387 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998); Headrick v.
Georgia (In re Headrick), 203 B.R. 805, 808 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Mather v. Employment Sec.
Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995); Burke v.
Georgia (In re Burke), 203 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996), affd on other grounds, 146 F.3d
1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2410 (1999).
126. In re Southern Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. at 426. Although Southern Star actually
predates Seminole Tribe, its reasoning has been followed by every court that has held section
106(a) to be constitutional since Seminole Tribe was published.
127. Id. at 422. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 549(a), 550(a) (1994) (permitting the trustee to avoid an
unauthorized postpetition transfer of property of the estate and to recover the transferred
property or its value from the transferee).
128. In re Southern Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. at 422. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (permitting the
trustee to bring an action to equitably subordinate the priority in distribution granted to the
claim of one creditor to the claims of other creditors).
129. See In re Southern Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. at 422.
130. See id. at 426. The Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment thus forbids states
from abridging the "privileges and immunities that flow from national citizenship." Storer v.
French (In re Storer), 58 F.3d 1125, 1128 (6th Cir. 1995).
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implicate" privileges and immunities within the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment and that, as a result, section 106(a) is a constitu-
tional embodiment of Congress's powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment.3' The court reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code
provides citizens with at least the following "privileges and immuni-
ties" within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment:
[The] efficient liquidation or other use and ratable distribution of a debtor's
assets, or (to put it another way) with immunity from the inefficient liquida-
tion or use and inequitable distribution of a debtor's assets which may occur
under State laws; the privilege of discharge, or... with immunity from op-
pressive debt collection which may obtain under State laws; liberty from eco-
nomic bondage, and protection against undue loss of value of property in exi-
gent financial circumstances; and fair and efficient determination of all of the
above, according to the process due in a national court of equitable jurisdiction,
without regard to persons or to any special privileges save those considered by
Congress to be justified as a matter of policy.
132
Courts that have followed Southern Star have adopted similar
reasoning. 13"
Courts of Appeals addressing the issue, however, unanimously
have rejected the Fourteenth Amendment as a means of "rescuing"
the viability of section 106(a).134 In so doing, the appellate courts have
focused on the legislative history of the statute35 where, not surpris-
131. In re Southern Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. at 426.
132. Id.
133. See Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 209 B.R. 540, 555 (D. Wyo.
1997), affd, 143 F.3d 1387 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998); Headrick v.
Georgia (In re Headrick), 203 B.R. 805, 808 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Burke v. Georgia (In re
Burke), 203 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996). Courts addressing the issue also could note
that bankruptcy is not a right of citizenship and that entities that are not individual human
beings, residents of the United States, or citizens may be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(9), (27), (40), (41), 109(a) (1994).
134. See, e.g., Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d
237, 244 (3d Cir. 1998); Department of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Management Co. (In re
Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1997), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1139 (5th Cir. 1997);
Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths), 119 F.3d 1140, 1146 (4th Cir. 1997); cf.
Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[l]f section 5 is not to be distended
beyond all reasonable bounds, it cannot be used to authorize legislation so remote from the
policies and objectives of the equal protection clause as [the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act] is.'); Elias v. United States (In re Elias), 218 B.R. 80, 84-86
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998).
135. See In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d at 244; In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 245; In re
Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1146; see also Bakst v. New Jersey (In re Ross), 234 B.R. 199,
202 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1999); In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 842 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997);
Schulman v. California Water State Resources Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358, 382
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); In re Lush Lawns, 203 B.R. 418, 421 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); Tri-City
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ingly, "there is simply no evidence suggesting that section 106(a) was
enacted pursuant to any constitutional provision other than Con-
gress's Bankruptcy Clause authority.136 The better reasoned result,
therefore, is that Seminole Tribe sounded the death knell for section
106(a) and that, as a result, states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
currently remains intact with respect to most, if not all, bankruptcy
causes of action brought against a state in federal bankruptcy court.
One very limited exception might lead a court to conclude that
section 106(a) effectively abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity
with respect to actions to remedy discriminatory practices brought
against a state in bankruptcy court pursuant to section 525 of the
Bankruptcy Code.137 Although there is no legislative history indicat-
ing that Congress promulgated Section 525 under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 138 the prohibition against discriminatory treatment goes
to the heart of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. A section 525 cause of action is analogous to a cause of
action brought under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States
Code.139 Although the Court has held Congress did not explicitly
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to
section 1983 of title 42,140 this precedent should not apply by analogy
Turf Club, Inc. v. Kentucky Racing Comm'n (In re Tri-City Turf Club), 203 B.R. 617, 620 (Bankr.
E.D. Ky. 1996) (The court can find no hint that Congress had in its collective mind Fourteenth
Amendment concerns when it enacted Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.").
136. [Ihe conclusion seems logically inescapable that in passing the 1994 [Bankruptcy]
Act Congress exercised the same specifically enumerated Article I bankruptcy power
that it has traditionally relied on in enacting prior incarnations of the bankruptcy law
dating back to 1800--68 years before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. We
will not presume that Congress intended to enact a law under a general Fourteenth
Amendment power to remedy an unspecified violation of rights when a specific, substan-
tive Article I power clearly enabled the law.
In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1146 (citation omitted). See also In re Sacred Heart
Hosp., 133 F.3d at 244; In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. at 840.
137. Section 106(a) expressly abrogates sovereign immunity with respect to section 525 of
the Bankruptcy Code. Section 525 protects debtors, who are, or have been, seeking protection
under the Bankruptcy Code from discriminatory treatment. See 11 U.S.C. § 525.
[Section 525] codifies the result in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), which held
that a state would frustrate the congressional policy of a fresh start for a debtor if it
were permitted to refuse to renew the debtor's driver's license because a tort judgment
against the debtor resulting from an automobile accident had been unpaid as a result of
a discharge in bankruptcy.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 366 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6321-22.
138. Congress is not required to state expressly that it enacts legislation pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983).
139. See Maya v. Philadelphia Gas Works (In re Maya), 8 B.R. 202 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
But see Toth v. Michigan State Hous. Dev. Auth., 136 F.3d 477, 479 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997).
140. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
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to preclude abrogation with respect to section 525 of the Bankruptcy
Code in light of the explicit reference to section 525 in section
106(a).141 Courts holding that they are without jurisdiction to order a
state to reinstate a debtor's driver's license have simply overlooked
the possibility that section 525 was promulgated under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 142
The potential flaw in relying on the Equal Protection Clause to
uphold abrogation with respect to section 525 is that bankruptcy
debtors are not members of suspect classifications. Some courts have
held that using the Equal Protection Clause and section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to overcome sovereign immunity should be
limited to discrimination based upon suspect classifications143 The
Supreme Court may resolve this issue during the October 1999
term. 1
44
141. Section 106(a) provides in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign
immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit... with respect
to... [section] 525 ... of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).
142. See, e.g., In re Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837, 842 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998); In re Perez, 220
B.R. 216, 224-25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998), affd, No. 98-2043, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21513 (D.N.J.
Aug. 10, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (holding in light of Seminole Tribe that "to the extent
earlier cases have relied on... the 'anti-discrimination provision' set forth at Bankruptcy Code
§ 525, to restore a debtor's driver's license... such reliance... is no longer applicable").
143. See Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1998); see also infra note 261
and accompanying text. But see Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, No. 98-1721, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13166, at *7 (8th Cir. June 14, 1999). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that Congress validly abrogated state Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Id. The court rejected the state's argument that
because disabled status is not a suspect classification Congress could not use the Fourteenth
Amendment exception to the Eleventh Amendment. Citing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Kimel v. Florida Bd of Regents, 139 F.3d 1429 (11th Cir. 1998), the court stated: "the mere fact
of non-suspect status does not preclude Congress from legislating on a group's behalf." Id. at
*23. Moreover, the court explained why the IDEA satisfies the Boerne "proportionality" test.
The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its views on non-suspect status in Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle,
No. 97-1825, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16945, at *23 (8th Cir. July 23, 1999).
144. See Kimel v. Florida Ed. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119
S. Ct. 901 (1999). Even if the Equal Protection Argument fails, section 525 might survive as a
provision protecting "property" rights secured by the Due Process Clause. See infra notes 276-
85 and accompanying text.
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IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN BANKRUPTCY CASES AFTER
SEMINOLE TRIBE AND ALDEN
Because Congress cannot simply "overrule" the decisions
(which, of course, are based on interpretations of the Constitution),
Seminole Tribe and Alden have created a "potentially irreconcilable
conflict" between the Bankruptcy Code, the Eleventh Amendment,
and constitutional sovereign immunity.145 Indeed, as noted at the
outset of this Article,146 constitutional sovereign immunity, as con-
strued by Seminole Tribe and Alden, might substantially undermine
the paramount bankruptcy policies of a debtor's discharge and "fresh
start" and of the fair and equitable distribution of the estate's assets
to creditors. For example, since the Seminole Tribe decision was
published, courts have held that unless states consent to bankruptcy
court jurisdiction, the Bankruptcy Code's provisions regarding
discharge,147 avoidance of preferences,48 avoidance of fraudulent
conveyances, 49 avoidance of unauthorized postpetition transfers, 5°
145. See In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 843 n.25 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
146. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
147. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1994); see, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Lapin (In re Lapin), 226 B.R.
637, 641 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); Mitchell v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 222
B.R. 877, 883-84 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); Elias v. United States (In re Elias), 218 B.R. 80, 83-84
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); Morrell v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Morrell), 218 B.R. 87, 90 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1998); Kish v. Verniero (In re Kish), 221 B.R. 118, 124 (D.N.J. 1997); Ranstrom v. IRS (In re
Ranstrom), 215 B.R. 454, 455-56 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997); Rose v. United States Dep't of Educ.
(In re Rose), 214 B.R. 372, 375 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997); Koehler v. Iowa College Student Aid
Comm'n (In re Koehler), 204 B.R. 210, 216-17 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997). But see Department of
Transp. and Dev. v. PNL Management Co. (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 243-44 (5th Cir.
1997).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 547; see, e.g., Brewer v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs. (In re
Value-Added Communications, Inc.), 224 B.R. 354, 359 (N.D. Tex. 1998); see also Ted Janger,
Strategies For Preserving the Bankruptcy Trustee's Avoidance Power Against States After
Seminole Tribe, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (1997).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 548; see, e.g., Sparkman v. Florida Dep't of Revenue (In re York-Hannover
Devs., Inc.), 201 B.R. 137, 138, 142 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding fraudulent conveyance
action brought by trustee against state was barred by Eleventh Amendment).
150. 11 U.S.C. § 549; see also Janger, supra note 148, at 1435. In Southern Star Foods, the
court held that the Eleventh Amendment defense was not available to a state because laws
enacted pursuant to Article I are enforceable through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mather
v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.) 190 B.R. 419, 426
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995). Because the Fourteenth Amendment exception cannot withstand
analysis as applied to a postpetition transfer in the bankruptcy context, the court should have
held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction against
the state in an adversary proceeding under section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code.
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turnover of property of the estate,151 protection against discriminatory
treatment,1 2 the automatic stay,153 and determination of tax liability
of the bankruptcy estate54 cannot be enforced against states in federal
bankruptcy courts. 5
Application of Seminole Tribe, Alden, and principles of
constitutional sovereign immunity to bankruptcy cases, however, will
not result in a blanket immunity from bankruptcy-related matters for
all governmental units. Rather, the scope of sovereign immunity is
limited by several established doctrines, which are summarized below
and have been explored and defined in a veritable torrent of opinions
published after the Seminole Tribe decision.
A. Only States and Agents Are Protected
One significant and well-established limitation on the scope of
Eleventh Amendment immunity is that only a state and its agents
may invoke the amendment's protection. Other governmental units,
including local jurisdictions such as counties and municipalities,
cannot avail themselves of the Eleventh Amendment and its protec-
tions.16
Because many tax and licensing issues involve local govern-
ments, the benefit to a bankruptcy estate and its creditors of such a
151. 11 U.S.C. § 542; see, e.g., Guiding Light Corp. v. Louisiana (In re Guiding Light Corp.),
213 B.R. 489, 491 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997); Horwitz v. Zywiczynski (In re Zywiczynski), 210 B.R.
924, 925-26 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997).
152. 11 U.S.C. § 525; see In re Perez, 220 B.R. 216, 224-25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995), affd, No.
98-2043, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21513 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 1998) (unpublished opinion).
153. 11 U.S.C. § 362; see, e.g., In re Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837, 843-44 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998);
Louis;Harris v. Barall (In re Louis;Harris), 213 B.R. 796, 798 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1997); Tri-City
Turf Club, Inc. v. Kentucky Racing Comm'n (In re Tri-City Turf Club), 203 B.R. 617, 618 (Bankr.
E.D. Ky. 1996); In re Martinez, 196 B.R. 225 (D.P.R. 1996).
154. 11 U.S.C. § 505; see Bakst v. New Jersey (In re Ross), 234 B.R. 199, 202-03 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1999); Mueller v. Idaho (In re Mueller), 211 B.R. 737, 739-40 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1997).
155. See In re Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837, 842 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998) (holding that finding
court lacked jurisdiction to compel state agency to return driver's license privilege even though
return of license is aspect of confirmed chapter 13 plan); In re Lush Lawns, Inc., 203 B.R. 418,
420 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Teresa K. Goebel, Comment, Obtaining Jurisdiction Over
States in Bankruptcy Proceedings After Seminole Tribe, 65 U. CI. L. REV. 911 (1998).
156. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Hadley
v. North Ark. Community Technical College, 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Eleventh
Amendment immunity does not extend to independent political subdivisions created by the
State, such as counties and cities.'); Ruehman v. Sheahan, 34 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 1994)
("[A]lthough states and their agencies are protected by the eleventh amendment, counties and
municipalities are not.'); In re Christie, 218 B.R. 27, 31 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998).
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limitation is clear. 57 However, because state law determines the
status of a particular governmental unit, a local governmental unit
that is regarded as autonomous in one state may be regarded as a
mere agent in another state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. '58
Moreover, the same kinds of governmental functions may be exercised
by an arm of the state in one state but by a local agency in another
state. 5 9 As a result, the "local government" exception to the Eleventh
Amendment has varying and inconsistent application.'r °
B. States Are Protected Only Against "Suits In Law Or Equity"
By its plain language, the Eleventh Amendment applies only to
"suits in law or equity.'' 61 As a consequence, several courts have
attempted to limit the applicability of Seminole Tribe on the ground
that bankruptcy cases, or at least particular matters within a
bankruptcy case, do not constitute "suits" within the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment. 162
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for example, has
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not per se preclude the
bankruptcy court's discharge of a claim held by a state because the
157. Because a local governmental unit cannot shield itself behind the Eleventh
Amendment, it is subject to the automatic stay provisions in § 362 and may be compelled to
appear in federal court to have its tax assessments determined pursuant to § 505.
158. See, e.g., Doyle, 429 U.S. at 280. The Ninth Circuit has articulated a five-prong test for
determining whether, under state law, a particular governmental unit is an agent of a state:
To determine whether a governmental agency is an arm of the state, the following fac-
tors must be examined: [1] whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state
funds, [2] whether the entity performs central governmental functions, [3] whether the
entity may sue or be sued, [4] whether the entity has the power to take property in its
own name or only the name of the state, and [5] the corporate status of the entity.
Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1992).
159. As the court in Belanger noted, California school districts, unlike school districts in
most of the states, have budgets that are controlled and funded by state government rather than
by local school districts. See Belanger, 963 F.2d at 251. Because school district funding comes
from the state, a judgment against a California school district will be paid out of the state
treasury. See id. at 252. Thus, in California, school districts are arms of the state. This result
differs from that in Doyle, where the Supreme Court concluded that Ohio school districts were
not arms of the state of Ohio. Doyle, 429 U.S. at 280.
160. Compare Moore v. Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21 (1973) (holding that a county is not
arm of the state under California law) with DeKalb County Div. of Family & Children's Servs. v.
Platter (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676, 679 n.1 (7th Cir. 1998) (implying county family services
division is an arm of the state).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
162. See Virginia v. Collins (In re Collins), 173 F.3d 924, 929 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding a
motion to reopen bankruptcy to determine whether a debt owed to state was dischargeable was
not a suit against the state).
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bankruptcy case in which the discharge was granted did not consti-
tute a "suit" against the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes:
In a bankruptcy case, in its simplest terms, a debtor turns over his assets,
which constitute the estate, for liquidation by a trustee for the benefit of credi-
tors according to their statutory priorities. Bankruptcy law modifies the
state's collection rights with respect to claims against the debtor, but it also
affords the state an opportunity to share in the collective recovery. Bank-
ruptcy operates by virtue of the Supremacy Clause and without forcing the
state to submit to suit in federal court. From this standpoint, [the debtor]'s en-
titlement to assert his discharge against the state's claims invoked no Elev-
enth Amendment consequences [because] [t]he state never was hauled into fed-
eral court against its will in the bankruptcy.
163
Other courts have reached the same conclusion with respect to
the determination of a debtor's tax liability to a state pursuant to
section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code'6 and with respect to the treat-
ment and discharge of a state's claim under a chapter 11 plan of
reorganization 165 or a chapter 13 plan of adjustment.166 Moreover,
prior to Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court had held that the
objection to a proof of claim filed by a state in a bankruptcy case did
not constitute a "suit" within the meaning of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.167
Although appearing to be a neat solution to the "problem" of
Eleventh Amendment immunity in bankruptcy cases and proceedings,
the actual application of the "bankruptcy cases are not suits for
Eleventh Amendment purposes" line of reasoning is quite limited. For
example, the Fifth Circuit itself expressly noted that the Eleventh
Amendment does apply to preclude the "commencement of certain
adversary proceedings directly against a state."168 Thus, courts have
held repeatedly that adversary proceedings to determine the dis-
chargeability of a debt to a state in fact are "suits" within the scope of
163. Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 822 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 865 (1999)
(emphasis added); see also Collins, 173 F.3d at 929.
164. See Smith v. Psychiatric Hosps., Inc. (In re Psychiatric Hosps., Inc.), 216 B.R. 660, 661
(M.D. Fla. 1998).
165. See In re Barrett Refining Corp., 221 B.R. 795, 801-08 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998).
166. See In re Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837, 847-50 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998).
167. See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947) ("If the claimant is a state, the
procedure of proof and allowance is not transmuted into a suit against the state because the
court entertains objections to the claim.").
168. Walker, 142 F.3d at 823.
1560 [Vol. 52:1527
1999] STATE DEFIANCE 1561
the Eleventh Amendment.169 Courts have reached the same conclu-
sion with respect to other complaints that request declaratory
judgments regarding other aspects of the operation of the bankruptcy
laws.170
The recent case In re Burkhardtl1l nicely illustrates the illusory
nature of this "limitation" on the Eleventh Amendment. In Burk-
hardt, a bankruptcy court held that it could enter an order confirming
a chapter 13 plan and discharging the debtor's debt to the state
because confirmation of the plan did not result in a "suit in law or
equity" that would trigger application of the Eleventh Amendment. 1"2
The court, however, concluded that the Eleventh Amendment
precludes enforcement of the discharge and thus the plan against the
state:
With its holding herein, the Court fully recognizes that in confirming a Chap-
ter 13 plan which contemplates a discharge of a debtor's motor vehicle viola-
tions upon completion of all payments under the Plan, the Bankruptcy Court is
in effect granting a "right without a remedy," insofar as the ability of this Court
to compel the restoration of a state issued driver's license. While acutely
aware of this anomaly created by the recognition of the discharge of the debt
under the federal bankruptcy statutes, without the jurisdictional ability to
compel the sovereign to enforce the discharge, the proper redress lies with the
United States Congress and is beyond the prerogative of this Court.7 3
As such, even though a bankruptcy case may not constitute a "suit"
for Eleventh Amendment purposes and a bankruptcy court accord-
ingly may have the power to enter orders in a case that directly
169. See, e.g., Mitchell v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Mitchell), 222 B.R. 877, 882-84
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); cf. Ranstrom v. IRS (In re Ranstrom), 215 B.R. 454, 455-56 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1997).
170. See, e.g., NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, LP), Nos. 98-
2211, 98-2244, 98-2271, 98-2272, 98-2273, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15499, *18-*27 (4th Cir.
July 12, 1999) (finding a debtor's motion for declaratory relief against the state to recover
transfer taxes is a suit subject to the Eleventh Amendment); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylva-
nia (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 204 B.R. 132, 137-39 (E.D. Pa. 1997), affd, 133 F.3d 1237 (3d
Cir. 1998) (adversary proceeding for a declaratory judgment regarding applicability of section
108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code); Guiding Light Corp. v. Louisiana (In re Guiding Light Corp.),
213 B.R. 489, 492 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997) (adversary proceeding for declaratory judgment
regarding extent of property of the estate).
171. In re Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837, 838 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998).
172. Id. at 849.
173. Id. at 850 (emphasis added); see also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Lapin (In re Lapin), 226
B.R. 637, 646 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to
sanction a state for violating a discharge order). But query whether the bankruptcy judge could
issue an Ex parte Young injunction against a state official to reinstate the debtor's driver's
license?
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affects the rights of a state, the bankruptcy court may be powerless to
enforce its orders against the state. If so, at least with respect to the
state, the debtor and its creditors may be no better off than if the
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction in the first place.174
C. Waiver of Immunity
States always may consent to be sued in federal court and can
waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity expressly. 17 Thus, proof
of a voluntary waiver of immunity by a state would constitute another
way to gain jurisdiction over a state consistent with constitutional
sovereign immunity.
176
The doctrine of waiver, however, is quite narrow in scope. For
example, a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity only if it
unequivocally expresses an intent to waive its constitutional immu-
nity protection,177 and a state's intent to waive is strictly construed.
Indeed, even a state's waiver of sovereign immunity in its own state
courts is insufficient to waive the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity to permit it to be sued in federal court.7 8
Moreover, in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Education Expense Board, the Court overturned the
"implied waiver" doctrine, 179 holding that a state does not waive its
sovereign immunity, constructively or by implication, merely by
174. But see infra Part IT1.E (discussing the possibility of enforcing bankruptcy court orders
against states in state courts).
175. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985) (stating that
a state may expressly consent to suit in federal court through a clear statement in its
constitution or a statute).
176. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199, 2204 (1999).
177. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); see also Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) ('The Court will give effect to a
State's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity 'only where stated by the most express
language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any
other reasonable construction.' ") (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974));
Magnolia Venture Capital Corp. v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 151 F.3d 439, 443-44 (5th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1115 (1999); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d
1415, 1421 (10th Cir. 1997).
178. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2205; Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241. In Atascadero,
the Court stated, "[a]lthough a State's general waiver of sovereign immunity may subject it to
suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh
Amendment 'absent a clear' intention to subject itself to suit in federal court." Id.; accord Smith
v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441-45 (1900).
179. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
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participating in a federal program.1 8° In College Savings Bank, the
petitioner argued that Florida waived its immunity to suits brought
under the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act ('TRCA") because
Florida voluntarily engaged in activities covered by the TRCA. A five-
member majority of the Court rejected the petitioner's argument,
reasoning that the "implied waiver" doctrine "stands as an anomaly in
the jurisprudence of sovereign immunity, and indeed in the jurispru-
dence of constitutional law."181
Nevertheless, it is possible for a state to explicitly waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Such a potential waiver presents
two important issues. First, what constitutes a sufficient waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity? Second, who has the authority to
waive immunity on behalf of a state?
When a state commences an adversary or similar proceeding in
a federal forum, whether a bankruptcy court or otherwise, it waives
its sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunity at least with
respect to the subject matter of that proceeding and any defenses,
counterclaims, and causes of action against the state that arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence on which the state's proceeding is
based.182 This comports with the general rule that a state waives its
immunity by "voluntarily invoking [federal court] jurisdiction."183
180. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2204-05; see also Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways
& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47; Kit Kinports, Implied
Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REV. 793, 800-01 (1998).
181. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2228 (1999). The Court stated the "implied waiver" doctrine violated the rule that a
state's express waiver of sovereign immunity be unequivocal. See id. The fact that the TRCA
placed states on notice that they could be subject to suit for conduct did not satisfy the
unequivocal express waiver test. Justice Scalia explained: "the most that can be said with
certainty is that the State has been put on notice that Congress intends to subject [the State] to
suits brought by individuals. That is very far from concluding that the State made an
'altogether voluntary' decision to waive its immunity." Id. (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S.
(20 How.) 527, 529 (1857)).
182. See, e.g., In re Platter, 140 F.3d 676, 679-80 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a state
waived sovereign immunity by commencing an adversary proceeding for declaratory relief that
its claim was nondischargeable); Confederated Tribes v. White (In re White), 139 F.3d 1268,
1271 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Initiation of a lawsuit is an action that 'necessarily establishes consent to
the court's adjudication of the merits of that particular controversy,' including the risk of being
bound by an adverse determination.) (quoting McClendon v. United States, 885 F.2d 627, 630
(9th Cir. 1989)). But see United States v. Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co., 81 F.3d 922, 931 (10th
Cir. 1996) (Applying pre-Bankruptcy Code law, the Tenth Circuit held that the United States
does not waive its sovereign immunity, absent consent, when its agents institute an action or
file a claim in court.); United States v. Forma, 42 F.3d 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1994) (Absent
unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity, a court does not have jurisdiction to hear a
counterclaim against the United States, even though the United States initiated the action.
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Courts have extrapolated that concept to hold that a state's
active participation in a bankruptcy case, even absent the com-
mencement of an adversary proceeding against the debtor, suffices to
waive the state's applicable immunity.'8 Moreover, the Supreme
Court long ago held that a state also waives its immunity when it files
a proof of claim in a debtor's bankruptcy case, even if it otherwise
does not participate in the bankruptcy case, at least with respect to
The court recognized, however, that the counterclaim could be asserted by way of setoff or
recoupment.). Murdock and Forma appear to conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in
Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947), in which the Court held that a state waives its
immunity when it files a proof of claim in a debtor's bankruptcy case. Moreover, Murdock and
Forma have little application in bankruptcy cases and proceedings where Congress has
explicitly waived federal sovereign immunity under section 106(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. See
also Davis v. U.S. Postal Serv. (In re Leeth Constr., Inc.), 170 B.R. 684, 688 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1994).
183. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228; see Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 200
U.S. 273, 284 (1906); see also Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226,
1235 (10th Cir. 1999) (The state waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by removing the case
from state court to federal court and litigating the merits of the case).
184. See, e.g., Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1389-90
(10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998); In re White, 139 F.3d at 1270-71 (holding
that Native American Tribe waived its immunity by twice voting on the debtor's plan of
reorganization, objecting to confirmation of the plan, submitting an order denying confirmation,
and otherwise participating in the bankruptcy case). The prospect that a state may waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity creates a potential conflict with traditional notions of
jurisdiction. Similar to a claim that a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, see
Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 869 F.2d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1989), a state may assert its Eleventh
Amendment immunity to bar federal jurisdiction at any point in litigation, including on appeal
for the first time. See Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1559 (10th Cir. 1992) (The
Eleventh Amendment defense is jurisdictional [and, therefore, is a threshold issue].").
Generally a party cannot waive the requirement that a federal court must have subject matter
jurisdiction over the matter being litigated; that is, the parties cannot confer subject matter
jurisdiction on a federal court. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456
U.S. 694, 702 (1982). But the Supreme Court has held consistently that a state may waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht,
118 S. Ct. 2047, 2052 (1998) ('The State can waive the defense."); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read,
322 U.S. 47 (1944); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). The reason for the distinction
between Eleventh Amendment immunity and subject matter jurisdiction lies in the history of
the Eleventh Amendment. The amendment has its roots in the ancient doctrine of sovereign
immunity, see Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934), which could always be waived
with proper consent. See The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868). The Court explained in
Clark v. Barnard that "immunity from suit belonging to a State, which is respected and
protected by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial power of the United States, is a
personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure." Clark, 108 U.S. at 447. '"The Amendment,
in other words, enacts a sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the
federal judiciary's subject matter jurisdiction." Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267
(1997). 'The Eleventh Amendment ... does not automatically destroy original jurisdiction."
Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2052. For an excellent overview of the debate whether the Eleventh
Amendment implicates subject matter or personal jurisdiction, see Glauberman, supra note 117,
at 69-70 & n.39.
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matters regarding allowance of that claim.185 Specifically, the Court
reasoned as follows:
It is traditional bankruptcy law that he who invokes the aid of the bankruptcy
court by offering a proof of claim and demanding its allowance must abide the
consequences of that procedure. If the claimant is a State, the procedure of
proof and allowance is not transmuted into a suit against the State because
the court entertains objections to the claim. The State is seeking something
from the debtor. No judgment is sought against the State. The whole process
of proof, allowance, and distribution is, shortly speaking, an adjudication of
interests claimed in a res. It is none the less such because the claim is rejected
in toto, reduced in part, given a priority inferior to that claimed, or satisfied in
some other way than payment in cash. When the State becomes an actor and
files a claim against the fund, it waives any immunity which it otherwise might
have had respecting the adjudication of the claim.
186
Based on such reasoning, Congress has enacted an express waiver of
sovereign immunity through section 106(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which provides for the following:
A governmental unit that has filed a proof of claim in the case is deemed to
have waived sovereign immunity with respect to a claim against such govern-
mental unit that is property of the estate and that arose out of the same trans-
action or occurrence out of which the claim of such governmental unit arose.
187
Thus, section 106(b) expressly deems the filing of a state's proof of
claim to be a waiver of immunity with respect to claims against the
185. See Gardner, 329 U.S. at 573; New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 329, 330 (1933);
see also Virginia v. Collins (In re Collins), 173 F.3d 924, 929-30 (4th Cir. 1999).
186. See Gardner, 329 U.S. at 573-74 (emphasis added); see also Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S.
at 332 ("If a state desires to participate in the assets of a bankrupt, she must submit to
appropriate requirements by the controlling power; otherwise, orderly and expeditious
proceedings would be impossible and a fundamental purpose of the Bankriiptcy Act would be
frustrated.").
187. In re Straight, 143 F.3d at 1390 (finding that section 106(b) codifies the Gardner rule).
See also 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1994) ("Notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity by a
governmental unit, there shall be offset against a claim or interest of a governmental unit any
claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate."). Critics of this view might
assert that section 106(b) is an abrogation of immunity rather than a waiver, because the filing
of a proof of claim is an act by a state that does not implicate immunity. On the contrary,
however, Congress has imposed a condition on the right of a state to file a proof of claim: under
section 106(b) the state's election to file a proof of claim is deemed a waiver of immunity with
respect to compulsory counterclaims, even if they exceed the amount of the claim and result in
an affirmative recovery. Moreover, a state cannot argue that it is deprived of a right of access to
the courts without due process of law. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution requires due
process when the federal government deprives a person of life, liberty or property. A state is not
a "person" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 323 (1966); In re Herndon, 188 B.R. 562, 565 n.8 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1995).
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state that arose out of the "same transaction or occurrence out of
which the claim of such governmental unit arose."188
Notwithstanding long-standing Supreme Court authority
regarding a state's waiver of sovereign immunity on the filing of a
proof of claim, however, several courts have held and commentators
have speculated, post-Seminole Tribe, that section 106(b) is an
unconstitutional attempt to "deem" a wavier on the part of the
states. 189 The courts finding section 106(b) to be unconstitutional
instead have adopted the standards used to identify compulsory
counterclaims under Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, holding that the "fundamental fairness of judicial process"
requires only that a state's proof of claim waives immunity with
respect to matters that would constitute compulsory counterclaims to
a typical complaint.190
These critics may find support in the Supreme Court's decision
in College Savings Bank in which Justice Scalia specifically distin-
guishes between notice to the states that Congress intended for the
states to be subject to suits in federal court and actual waivers of
immunity by the states. 191 Under the College Savings Bank rationale,
section 106(b)'s effect should be no more than to notify states that
Congress intended for the states to be subject to federal court jurisdic-
tion. Thus, under College Savings Bank, it may be said that section
106(b)'s abrogation of immunity is unconstitutional.
Other courts, however, have held that section 106(b) is
constitutional notwithstanding Seminole Tribe.192 These opinions
188. 11 U.S.C. § 106(b).
189. See, e.g., Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths, Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140,
1147 (4th Cir. 1997); Rose v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1997); Grabscheid v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re C.J. Rogers, Inc.), 212 B.R. 265
(E.D. Mich. 1997); In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 239 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); see also Harden v.
Texas Dep't of Transp. (In re Aer-Aerotron, Inc.), 104 F.3d 677, 683 (4th Cir. 1997) (Niemeyer,
J., concurring). One commentator notes that filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy may be an
insufficient voluntary act by the state to constitute a waiver because the state has no
alternative forum in which to collect on its claim. See S. Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign Immunity
in Bankruptcy: The Next Chapter, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 212 (1996). Another flatly states
that Congress does not have the power to decree that a state's filing a proof of claim constitutes
a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Glauberman, supra note 117, at 89.
190. See Brewer v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs. (In re Value-Added
Communications, Inc.), 224 B.R. 354, 357 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
191. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2228 (1999).
192. See, e.g., In re Straight, 143 F.3d at 1391-92; Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 820-23
(5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 865 (1999); Dekalb County Div. of Family & Children's
Servs. v. Platter (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676, 678-80 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Aer-Aerotron, 104
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represent the better view because they recognize the states are
voluntarily invoking federal jurisdiction by filing a proof of claim. 193
Nevertheless, because section 106(b) imposes a "same transaction or
occurrence" test that is similar, if not identical, to the standards used
to determine compulsory counterclaims, the same results generally
will occur under both lines of authority.194
Finally, a minority of courts has determined that a state's
filing of a proof of claim represents a broad consent to suit in federal
court, regardless of the nature of claim at issue.195 Notwithstanding
the persuasive reasoning followed by this line of cases, the conclusion
that a proof of claim amounts to a broad waiver is difficult to defend
in light of the language of section 106(b) and the Supreme Court's
insistence on strictly construing waivers of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. 196 Of course even if immunity is not waived, the estate
may still assert any of the debtor's defenses to disallow the state's
claim.197
Waiver will likely continue to be one of the most vigorously
contested issues in disputes between states and other parties to a
bankruptcy proceeding. As one commentator recognized, "the
doctrine of waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity... provides a
foothold for the efforts of bankruptcy trustees and courts to assert
authority over states in the bankruptcy process, while also respecting
federalism concerns."' 98 Despite the courts' splintering, debtors and
F.3d at 680; Confederated Tribes v. White (In re White), 139 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998); In
re Fennelly, 212 B.R. 61, 63 (D.N.J. 1997); Schulman v. California State Water Resources
Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358, 377 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
193. See cases cited supra note 185.
194. See, e.g., Georgia Dep't of Revenue v. Burke (In re Burke), 146 F.3d 1313, 1317 n.8
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2410 (1999); Mather v. Oklahoma Employment Sec.
Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995); In re
Value-Added Communications, Inc., 216 B.R. at 550 (noting that the same result occurs under
section 106(b) and the compulsory counterclaim test) Burke v. Georgia (In re Burke), 203 B.R.
493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996) (noting that "§ 106(b) may well be a correct restatement of the
jurisprudence regarding waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
195. See, e.g., In re Fennelly, 212 B.R. at 64 (holding that, irrespective of section 106, a
state may consent to be sued in federal court, and filing a proof of claim constitutes consent);
Ossen v. Connecticut Dep't of Soc. Servs. (In re Charter Oaks Assocs.), 203 B.R. 17, 22 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1996) ("In short, because section 106[b] unambiguously alerts the states as to the
consequence of filing a bankruptcy claim.., a governmental unit that does so waives its
sovereign immunity.') (quoting WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996,
1003 (1st Cir. 1988)); Burke v. Georgia (In re Burke), 200 B.R. 282, 287 (1996); In re Barrett
Refining Corp., 221 B.R. 795, 810 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998).
196. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
197. See 11 U.S.C. § 558 (1994); Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947).
198. Goebel, supra note 155, at 928.
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creditors, other than a state, should take comfort with what appears
to be a rough majority rule-that a state waives its Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity when it files a proof of claim, at least with respect to
that claim and other claims satisfying the transaction/occurrence test.
Another limitation on the waiver doctrine, however, is that not
all agents of a state have authority to waive the state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The law of a particular state determines who
has the authority to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity,'"9 and
in many cases, state law requires an act of the state legislature to
effectuate a valid waiver of immunity.0° As a result, at least one
court has held that since the state had not authorized a state attorney
general to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the attorney
general's proof of claim simply was not sufficient to effect a waiver,
notwithstanding section 106(b). 201 Moreover, a split of authority exists
with respect to the question whether, even if there has been a duly
authorized waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity as a result of a
proof of claim filed by one state agency or arm of a state, such a
waiver eliminates Eleventh Amendment immunity just for that one
agency or for the entire state and other agencies of the state.202
Consonant with what constitutes a waiver, the issue whether a state
199. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945); Magnolia
Venture Capital Corp. v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 151 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 1115 (1999) ("[Ihe state's waiver must be accomplished by someone to whom that
power is granted under state law.'); Mark Browning, Who Can Waive State Immunity, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 15, 1997, at 10 (contending that states may only waive immunity by
constitution or statute).
200. See Gardner, 329 U.S. at 573; Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 467.
201. See Midland Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 200 B.R. 453, 459
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); see also Magnolia Venture Capital Corp., 151 F.3d at 444, (holding that
authority to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot be inferred from a general
authorization to enter into contracts); Georgia Dep't of Revenue v. Burke (In re Burke), 146 F.3d
1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2410 (1999); Mather v. Oklahoma
Employment Sec. Comm'n (In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D.
Okla. 1995); Burke v. Georgia (In re Burke), 203 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); see also
Estate of Porter v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that under Illinois law, the
state attorney general is not authorized to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in a non-
bankruptcy context).
202. Compare Wyoming Dep't of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1390
(10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998) (holding that the waiver on behalf of one
state agency constitutes a waiver for all state agencies), Brewer v. New York State Dep't of
Correctional Servs. (In re Value-Added Communications, Inc.), 216 B.R. 547, 549 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1997) (same), and Ossen v. Connecticut Dep't of Soc. Servs. (In re Charter Oak Assocs.),
203 B.R. 17, 22 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996) (same), with Schulman v. California State Water
Resources Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358, 378 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding waiver
limited to waiving agency), and Rocchio & Sons, Inc. v. Rhode Island Dep't of Transp. (In re
Rocchio & Sons, Inc.), 165 B.R. 86, 88 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1994).
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official is authorized to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity and
bind all other arms of the state will continue to be significant for the
courts. The split in authority over these issues merely reflects the
overall problem created by Seminole Tribe-trying to vindicate the
need for a centralized, efficient, and just reorganization or distribu-
tion of resources in a context where a state, by virtue of the Supreme
Court's strained interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, can seize
a preferred position.
D. Ex parte Young Injunctions.
Another "exception" to the Eleventh Amendment is the Ex
parte Young doctrine.203 Under Ex parte Young, a federal court may
exercise "federal jurisdiction over a suit against a state official when
that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to 'end a
continuing violation of federal law.' ,,204 Thus, although a federal
bankruptcy judge presumably cannot, after Seminole Tribe, issue a
money judgment against a state without a waiver of immunity, he or
she may be able, under Ex parte Young, to issue a prospective
injunction to enjoin state officials from violating the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. But a prospective injunction will not be effective to
recover preferences or fraudulent transfers paid into the state
treasury or property transferred to the state before the commence-
ment of a bankruptcy case or property seized by the state after the
commencement of the bankruptcy case before the injunction issues.
The Court in Seminole Tribe, however, made it difficult to
invoke the Ex parte Young exception.205 In fact, in Seminole Tribe
itself, the plaintiff actually had sought an injunction against the
Governor of the State of Florida for prospective injunctive relief under
Ex parte Young.206 The Court, however, refused to permit even that
aspect of the plaintiffs case to proceed because "Congress ha[d]
prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a
203. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149 (1908).
204. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.
64, 68 (1985)).
205. See id.; see ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 904 (1999). See also Gibson, supra note 189, at 213. Indeed, one commentator
has speculated that "Young may not be good law for long." Glauberman, supra note 117, at 80.
206. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73.
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State of a statutorily created right.."207 Thus, the Court reasoned,
Congress "chose to impose upon the state a liability that is signifi-
cantly more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the
State officer under Ex parte Young,"208 and Congress therefore must
have intended not to impose Ex parte Young liability on a state
official.209
Simply put, under Seminole Tribe, congressional intent
regarding enforcement of federal statutes against the states is
important in the Ex parte Young context.210 Specifically, with respect
to bankruptcy law, the question is whether the Bankruptcy Code
provides a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a
state of a statutorily created right.211 At least one bankruptcy court
has concluded that it does not,2 2 a result that appears to be correct.
Specifically, a "detailed remedial" scheme, as described by Seminole
Tribe, exists where Congress has crafted an intricate statutory
scheme that limits or prohibits potential remedies.213 Although the
207. Id. at 74 (emphasis added). Under IGRA, on request of a tribe, a state is required to
negotiate in good faith with a tribe to create a class III tribal-state gaming compact. See 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994). If the state is not responsive, the tribe may sue the state in
federal district court where the state has the burden of proving that it has negotiated in good
faith. See id. § 2710(d)(7). If the district court finds that the state has failed to negotiate in
good faith, then a detailed negotiation and mediation procedure is prescribed from which a
state-tribal compact must result. See id. § 2710(d)(7)(B). The district court is not authorized to
award monetary damages or any other remedy against the state.
208. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75.
209. See id.; see also Gibson, supra note 189, at 214.
210. See Gibson, supra note 189, at 214.
211. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75; supra note 210,.
212. See Guiding Light Corp. v. Louisiana Dep't of Health & Hosps. (In re Guiding Light
Corp.), 213 B.R. 489, 492 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1997); see also Schmitt v. Missouri Western State
College (In re Schmitt), 220 B.R. 68, 79 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1998). As one commentator noted, the
statutory scheme in Seminole Tribe is distinguishable from the bankruptcy enforcement
mechanism because in Seminole Tribe, the IGRA permitted only substantially limited relief
against a state in federal court. More importantly, Congress had established a "system of
mediation and possible intervention by the Secretary of the Interior." Gibson, supra note 197, at
215. The Bankruptcy laws do not substantially limit relief in federal court; if anything, the
opposite is true. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); cf. Ellis v. University of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186,
1198 (10th Cir. 1998) (Congress did not craft a detailed remedial scheme when it enacted 42
U.S.C. § 1981 because there was "nothing in § 1981 that shows Congress intended to limit or bar
remedies generally available to an aggrieved party.'). Although the United States Trustee has
standing to be heard on any bankruptcy matter, the Trustee's standing flows from the need to
protect the rights of the United States and not, like the Secretary of the Interior, to facilitate a
specific mediation between a Native American tribe and a state. See 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)-(v).
213. See ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 1998). In ANR
Pipeline, the Tenth Circuit considered the issue of whether the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1341, was a "detailed remedial scheme" that precluded use of the Ex parte Young doctrine. See
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Bankruptcy Code is certainly an intricate weaving of various policies
and considerations, there is nothing in the Code that indicates
Congress intended to limit or prevent certain remedies against a state
or state officials.214
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently recognized yet another
limitation on the use of Ex parte Young. In Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, the Court held that the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply
where the requested injunctive relief implicates a state's "special
sovereignty interests.215 Because the ability of a state to levy and
ANR Pipeline, 150 F.3d at 1188. The court held the Tax Injunction Act was a "detailed remedial
scheme" under Seminole Tribe because Congress expressly limited the power of federal courts to
issue certain types of remedies pertaining to the assessment, levy or collection of state taxes.
See id. at 1191.
214. Although section 362(a) is an automatic stay against creditors, it is not a limit on the
debtor's remedies, except perhaps for section 362(h), which grants individual debtors detailed
remedies for willful violations of the stay. "An individual injured by any willful violation of a
stay provided by [section 362] shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees,
and in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages." 11 U.S.C. § 362(h); cf.
Pinkstaff v. United States (In re Pinkstaf), 974 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaiing that if the
United States waives sovereign immunity, an individual debtor can assert a compulsory
counterclaim for actual damages under section 362(h)). Nor is there a detailed remedial scheme
in section 105 of the Code. It provides in relevant part: "The court may issue any order, process,
or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. §
105(a). In enacting section 105, Congress intended to not limit, but expand, remedies available
to aggrieved parties. "[A]ithough the waters may have been muddied a bit, it appears to
continue to be permissible to sue state officials in the bankruptcy court in their official
capacities to prevent future violations of the bankruptcy laws." Gibson, supra note 189, at 215.
215. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997); id. at 289 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In Coeur d'Alene, a Native-American tribe sought a declaratory judgment against
the State of Idaho establishing the Tribe's right to quiet enjoyment over submerged lands
located in Idaho as well as prospective injunctive relief against state officials to prevent them
from exercising the state's asserted regulatory jurisdiction over the lands. Id. at 265-66. The
Court held that Ex parte Young may not be used when the requested injunctive relief was
"functional[ly] equivalent" to an award of money damages: "[lt is apparent.., that if the Tribe
were to prevail, Idaho's sovereign interest in its land and waters would be affected in a degree
fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury." Id. at
287. Moreover, in Coeur d'Alene, two Justices further attempted to limit the Ex parte Young
doctrine by imposing a case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry into whether (a) an available forum
existed to vindicate the federal rights at issue, and (b) the matter involves the interpretation of
novel questions of important federal law. Id. at 270. A majority of the Court, however, held
that the appropriate inquiry under Ex parte Young remains "a straightforward inquiry into
whether a complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly
characterized as prospective." Id. at 296 (O'Connor, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part);
id. at 298-99 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsberg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); see also Earles v. State Bd.
of Certified Pub. Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1039 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 444
(1998); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). However, a 5-4
majority in Coeur d'Alene recognized the special sovereignty interest exception to Ex parte
Young. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 269 (Kennedy, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, & Thomas,
J.J.). At least one circuit has stated that Coeur d'Alene places a new limitation on the
application of Exparte Young. See ANR Pipeline, 150 F.3d at 1193; see also James E. Pfander,
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collect taxes is a "special sovereignty interest,"216 prospective injunc-
tive relief in bankruptcy, granted pursuant to the Ex parte Young
doctrine, might conceivably implicate a state's "special sovereignty
interest" in its power to levy and collect taxes and therefore be
inapplicable.217 On the other hand, because Congress has created
exclusive jurisdiction over property of the estate in the federal district
courts, 2 8 a court could conclude that the state's sovereignty interest
does not extend to the federally created bankruptcy estate.2
19
E. The In Rem Exception
Bankruptcy courts have exclusive in rem jurisdiction "of all
property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of
[the bankruptcy case], and of property of the estate."220 Such in rem
jurisdiction enables bankruptcy courts to determine the claims and
interests in and to property of the estate,21 including the claims and
An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal Appellate Court Review of State-
Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REV. 161, 188 (1998).
216. See ANR Pipeline, 150 F.3d at 1194 ("The [appellants] request to rewrite Kansas'
property tax code with respect to its application against the personal property of natural gas
pipelines is certainly a major intrusion into Kansas' special sovereignty interests.).
217. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (the automatic stay); 11 U.S.C. § 505 (determination of tax
liability).
218. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1994).
219. Like the federal government, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, states have the power to
lay and collect taxes. The power to tax is a critical function of government, see McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819), and the issue whether a state may levy a tax has
formed the substance of one of American jurisprudence's most recognized statements in one of
its most famous cases. Id. at 431 ("That the power to tax involves the power to destroy.).
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e); see also Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123
F.3d 777, 787 (4th Cir. 1997); O'Brien v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (In re O'Brien),
216 B.R. 731, 737 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998). Section 1334(e)
was intended to eliminate jurisdictional disputes arising from the equity principle that
makes in rem jurisdiction over an item of property exclusive in the first court to assert
jurisdiction over it. A creditor might file a lien against property of the debtor in a court
in State A and shortly afterward the debtor might declare bankruptcy in State B. Con-
trol over the debtor's property would be shared by the court in A and the bankruptcy
court in B-it might even be the same piece of property... Section 1334(d) gives the
bankruptcy court control of all the property. Creditors who want to enforce their liens
have to do so in that court regardless of the location of the creditor or the property.
In re United States Brass Corp., 110 F.3d 1261, 1268 (7th Cir. 1997).
221. See In re O'Brien, 216 B.R. at 737 (quoting JAMES WM. MOORE ETAL., 16 MOORE'S FED.
PRACTICE 108-06 (3d ed. 1997)):
Our in rem jurisdiction over property of the debtor and the estate empowers us "to de-
termine all claims that anyone, whether named in the action or not, has to the property
or thing in question. The proceeding is one 'against the world.' The practical effect of
such an action is to establish unquestionable title to the property because no one can
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interests of a state in and to such property notwithstanding a state's
assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity.- The reason for this is
that, unlike an adversary proceeding that causes the bankruptcy
court "to issue process summoning the state to appear," the exercise of
in rem jurisdiction simply is not a "suit against one of the United
States by a private party."22 Rather, it is a "suit," if at all, against the
property itself.
Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust 224 is a good
example of this concept. In that case, the State of Maryland and two
local counties brought suit in state court to collect taxes on transfers
of estate property made pursuant to a confirmed plan of reorganiza-
tion and the bankruptcy court's confirmation order, which exempted
the relevant transfers from state taxes.225 Although the state taxing
authorities had received adequate notice of the bankruptcy case, they
declined to participate by filing a proof of claim or otherwise.22 After
the case was removed to federal court, the taxing authorities asserted
that the Eleventh Amendment barred the bankruptcy court from
exercising jurisdiction over them in the confirmation proceeding and
that, as a result, its confirmation order could not and did not bind the
taxing authorities to the plan.7
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the state's
argument. Among other things, the court reasoned that a confirma-
tion order "was not entered in a suit 'against one of the United States'
filed by a private party,"' 8 and that the power to enter a confirmation
order was derived, not from jurisdiction over a state or creditors, but
later claim exemption from the effect of the judgment on the ground that the court
lacked jurisdiction.
222. See Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 786. But see French v. Georgia Dep't of Revenue (In re
ABEPP Acquisition Corp.), 215 B.R. 513, 517 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1997) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment immunity applied to a debtor's adversary proceeding to recover prepetition tax
payments, noting (questionably) that the debtor "has not alleged that the 3% tax remained an
identifiable res").
223. Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 786-87; see supra Part III.B.
224. Antonelli, 123 F.3d 777.
225. See 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c) (1994) ("the making or delivery of an instrument of transfer
under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this title[ ] may not be taxed under any law
imposing a stamp tax or similar tax').
226. See Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 780.
227. See id. at 786.
228. Id.; see supra Part lIlI.B. If, however, the debtor pays transfer taxes and sues the state
to recover the transfer taxes, the state may assert Eleventh Amendment immunity to bar the
suit. See NVR Homes, Inc. v. Clerks of the Circuit Courts (In re NVR, LP), Nos. 98-2211, 98-
2244, 98-2271, 98-2272, 98-2273, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15499, at "18--27 (4th Cir. July 12,
1999).
1999] 1573
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1527
rather from jurisdiction over the debtor and the property of its
estate.29 Thus, a party's status or assertion of immunity had no
bearing "on the bankruptcy court's power to determine whether the
terms of a reorganization plan comply with federal law. '230
The court further noted that, if the state wanted to challenge a
bankruptcy court's order of which it had notice, it could waive
Eleventh Amendment immunity and submit to federal jurisdiction.231
Recognizing that such may present a Hobson's choice for the states,
the court noted that the choice resulted from "Congress' constitution-
ally authorized legislative power to make federal courts the exclusive
venue for administering the bankruptcy law."232
The Supreme Court recently examined the in rem "exception"
to Eleventh Amendment immunity in California and State Lands
Commission v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.,23 which was decided after
Seminole Tribe. In Deep Sea Research, the Court held that, at least in
cases where a state does not have actual possession of the vessel at
issue, the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude a suit pursuant to
the federal courts' in rem admiralty jurisdiction0s4 to determine title to
an abandoned shipwreck, even where the state is one of the potential
title holders.2 3
5
229. See Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 786.
230. Id. at 787.
231. See id.
232. Id.; see also O'Brien v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R.
731, 737 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998) ('The Eleventh Amendment is not violated, because [the state]
cannot be compelled to appear and defend. It can choose to stay home."); Schulman v. California
State Water Resources Control Bd. (In re Lazar), 200 B.R. 358, 380 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) (The
fact that a state "finds these choices unattractive does not convert the choice into an involuntary
decision: if this were so, many of the choices that people make in many different contexts of life
would be 'involuntary,' and some people could live virtually their entire lives without making
any voluntary choices at all."); cf. New Jersey v. Mocco, 206 B.R. 691, 693 (D.N.J. 1997) (The
very object and purpose of the [Eleventh] Amendment [is] to prevent the indignity of subjecting
a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties .... In the
present case, the state is not a defendant and, as such, cannot invoke the protection of the
Eleventh Amendment.'). The question of a compulsory waiver of immunity is developed more
fully supra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
233. California & State Lands Comm'n v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1464 (1998).
234. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1994). Federal admiralty jurisdiction encompasses "maritime
causes of action begun and carried on as proceedings in rem, that is, where a vessel or thing
itself is treated as the offender and made the defendant by name or description in order to
enforce a lien." Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560 (1954). Even though suits in
admiralty are not suits in "law or equity," the Supreme Court has applied the Eleventh
Amendment to admiralty suits generally. See Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 498 (1921).
235. See Deep Sea Research, 118 S. Ct. at 1472. Four concurring Justices in Deep Sea
Research (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer) indicated that they would reach
the same result regardless of whether the property at issue was in the possession of the state.
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Given that result, and the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in
Antonelli, states may be unable to raise their Eleventh Amendment
immunity to avoid the application of orders entered generally in a
bankruptcy case, such as, for example, orders confirming a plan of
reorganization, orders authorizing the sale of property of the estate,
or, perhaps, orders enforcing the automatic stay.236 As long as the
order pertains to property of the bankruptcy estate, the Eleventh
Amendment should not be an obstacle to its enforcement where the
debtor is in possession of the property.
2 37
However, as with those cases that hold that bankruptcy cases
generally are not "suits" within the meaning of the Eleventh Amend-
ment,'238 the scope of this in rem "exception" is not limitless. In fact,
the Supreme Court specifically has held that an in rem jurisdictional
basis, standing alone, does not provide authorization for the issuance
of process directly against a state:
The fact that a suit in a federal court is in rem, or quasi in rem, furnishes no
ground for the issuance of process against a non-consenting State .... [W]hen
the State does not come in and withholds its consent, the court has no author-
ity to issue process against the State to compel it to subject itself to the court's
judgment, whatever the nature of the suit.
239
Moreover, the Court specifically has noted, in the bankruptcy context,
that "we have never applied an in rem exception to the sovereign-
immunity bar against monetary recovery, and have suggested that no
Id. at 1473-74 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1474 (Kennedy, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ.,
concurring).
236. For example, the in rem theory has been applied to a discharge order, which was
subsequently used as an affirmative defense against a state in state court, see Texas v. Walker,
142 F.3d 813, 820-22 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 865 (1999), and an adjudication of
dischargeability where the state filed an adversary proceeding. See Dekalb County Div. of
Family & Children's Servs. v. Platter (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676, 679-80 (7th Cir. 1998).
237. The in rem exception is not necessarily limited only to those circumstances where the
debtor possesses the property, as long as the state does not have possession. In Bouchard
Transportation Co. v. Updegraff, the court, interpreting Deep Sea Research, held that a state is
not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity where the plaintiff neither named the state in a
suit or served the state with process and the res was in the possession of the court. Bouchard
Transp. Co. v. Updegraff, 147 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Florida does not have
possession of the disputed res-the [res is] part of the record in this case, currently in the
possession of the federal judiciary.").
238. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
239. Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 28 (1933); see also O'Brien v. Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources (In re O'Brien), 216 B.R. 731, 737 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998) (citing Freeman v.
Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 189 (1886) ("[N]o personal liability... can be created against the absent
[state]; the power of the court being limited to the disposition of the property, which is alone
within its jurisdiction)).
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such exception exists."240 As a result, the in rem nature of bankruptcy
cases and proceedings likely does not enable a trustee or debtor in
possession to bring affirmative causes of action for monetary recovery,
such as preference or fraudulent conveyance actions, against a state
in bankruptcy court absent the state's consent. It is unclear whether
the trustee or debtor in possession can obtain an order requiring the
state to turn over property of the estate in the state's possession.
Finally, following Alden, it is not clear that the in rem "excep-
tion" or, indeed, any limitation of state immunity based upon the text
of the Eleventh Amendment, retains any practical viability whatso-
ever. If, as discussed above,241 Alden means that the Court now has
enshrined common law sovereign immunity with Constitutional
status and essentially rendered the Eleventh Amendment underinclu-
sive and redundant,242 the in rem doctrine simply has no further
applicability because, unlike the Eleventh Amendment, the common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity is not limited merely to "suits in
law or equity." If not limited to "suits," the foundations of the in rem
doctrine fall away, leaving Alden's concept of constitutional common
law sovereign immunity to preclude all actions that affect non-
consenting states, even those that may not be deemed to be "suits"
within'the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.
F. The Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause presents an intriguing
constitutional possibility in overcoming a state's Eleventh Amend-
ment defense. The Clause provides: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."243 A person who is
deprived of a vested legal cause of action by the government
44 is
deprived of property and must be justly compensated.245. Courts have
240. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 38 (1992) (emphasis added).
241. See supra Part 1.C.
242. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
243. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
244. The Takings Clause applies to both the federal government and, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, the states. See, e.g., Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980). See also infra note 251.
245. See Alliance of Descendants of Tex. Land Grants v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478, 1481
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that a legal cause of action is property within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment.); cf. McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd., 906 F. Supp. 749, 769 (D.R.I.
1995) ("Contract rights are as much private property under the Takings Clause as they are
under the Due Process Clause.!).
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held that the United States may not assert its sovereign immunity as
a defense to a Takings Clause claim.246 By asserting a sovereign
immunity defense, the state acts to deprive a debtor's estate of vested
legal causes of action, such as preferences and fraudulent convey-
ances, for money damages.
Prior to Alden, the Takings Clause argument stopped short of
success. If the state itself provided a forum for compensation, there
could be no impermissible taking of private property, and as a result,
a state could continue to assert an Eleventh Amendment immunity
defense. In Harbert International, Inc. v. James, the plaintiff
asserted a Fifth Amendment "takings" claim for money damages
against state officials, alleging the state's failure to make payments
and perform contractual duties in connection with the construction of
a bridge constituted a taking without just compensation.247 The state
asserted the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to federal court jurisdic-
tion.248 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the
state could assert the Eleventh Amendment defense because "Ala-
bama state courts do provide Harbert with a means of redress for its
claim.''249 Thus, if the state provides a forum in which it may be sued,
there is no taking of a debtor's estate's cause of action for money
damages.
Alden dramatically changes the analysis. By allowing a state
to use sovereign immunity to defeat federal claims brought in state
courts, unless the state has consented to suit, Alden leaves parties
with no ability to seek a money damages remedy for the deprivation of
a federal right. The practical effect of leaving no forum to enforce
vested causes of action is to deprive the parties possessing those
actions of "property" without just compensation. Takings claims could
be legitimate options for parties seeking to enforce their bankruptcy
rights against those states that have not consented to be sued in state
courts.
2 0
246. See Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 980 n.7 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Actions brought
under the taking clause of the fifth amendment are, of course, an exception to the rule that
sovereign immunity is a bar to damages against the United States for direct constitutional
violations.').
247. See Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 1998).
248. See id. at 1276.
249. Id. at 1277.
250. Any 'Takings" claim must first exhaust existing state law 'Just compensation"
remedies. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 (1997). Usually a
takings claimant will need to show an exhaustion of state "inverse condemnation" causes of
action. See id. at 734 n.8 ("Ordinarily, a plaintiff must seek compensation through state inverse
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The Takings claim will fail, however, for the simple reason
that in order enforce the Takings Clause against a state, a party must
rely on the Fourteenth Amendment.21 But the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by itself does not abrogate a state's immunity22 and the current
statutory vehicle for bringing such a claim, section 1983 of title 42,
does not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity.253
V. CONGRESS MAY EXERCISE POWER TO LIMIT THE IMPACT OF
SEMINOLE TRTBE, ALDEN, AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
As explained above,254 the Supreme Court's construction of the
Eleventh Amendment under Seminole Tribe and establishment of the
new constitutional sovereign immunity doctrine under Alden risk
undermining the paramount bankruptcy policies of a debtor's dis-
charge and "fresh start," and of the fair and equitable distribution of
the estate's assets to creditors. Indeed, at its most basic level,
Seminole Tribe's and Alden's discovery of a constitutional right to
sovereign immunity undermines essential aspects of bankruptcy law
by elevating states to preferred positions relative to other creditors.
Except to any extent the states consent to be sued, states appear to be
free to infringe upon the bankruptcy rights of other parties without
fear of suit for money damages in any court.255
condemnation proceedings before initiating a takings suit in federal court, unless the state does
not provide adequate remedies for obtaining compensation.'); see also Villas of Lake Jackson,
Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 612 (11th Cir. 1997). If a state does not provide a forum for
bringing inverse condemnation claims against the state, either by failing to provide a cause of
action by statute or through assertion of constitutional sovereign immunity, then the
exhaustion prerequisite has been satisfied. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 734 n.8.
251. The Fifth Amendment, according to its literal language, applies only to the federal
government. However, the substantive protections of the Fifth Amendment are applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897).
252. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978).
253. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340 (1979). Of course Congress could abrogate the
states' immunity for section 1983 actions or enact other appropriate legislation to redress
monetarily the wrongs asserted under the Takings Clause. See Garrett v. Illinois, 612 F.2d
1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980). We address this point further in Part IV.A.
254. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
255. Alden asserts that the fear of the unrestrained state is without merit:
We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the
binding laws of the United States. The good faith of the States thus provides an impor-
tant assurance that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI.).
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Moreover, as noted above, the existing options to ameliorate
the effects of constitutional sovereign immunity are only of limited
effectiveness in the bankruptcy context. As a result, Congress should
consider enacting legislation to neutralize some of the deleterious
effects of the Supreme Court's decisions, and this Article sets forth
five potential avenues that Congress could explore.2s First, Congress
could purport to re-enact section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Second,
Congress could authorize United States trustees, and possibly private
trustees or debtors-in-possession, to sue states for bankruptcy causes
of action in the name of the United States. Third, Congress could
amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide for a standing injunction
against state officials pursuant to the Ex parte Young doctrine.
Fourth, Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide for
disallowance of a state's claim, unless the state waived sovereign
immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity regarding the claim
and compulsory counterclaims. Fifth, Congress could encourage a
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity through conditions to the
receipt of federal funds.
A. Reenactment Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Because legislation enacted pursuant to the Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity257 or sovereign immunity,28 Congress conceivably could
purport to reenact section 106(a) under the guise of its Fourteenth
Amendment Enforcement Clause authority.259 The reenacted section
106(a), however, likely would fail as an unconstitutional abrogation of
256. Other commentators have analyzed congressional options after Seminole with respect
to a broader range of federal regulatory issues. See, e.g., Glauberman, supra note 125, at 100-16
(discussing conditional spending power, suit by the United States, and amendment of exclusive
jurisdiction statutes); Meltzer, supra note 114, at 49-61 (discussing Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, conditional spending power, and suit by the United States).
257. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
258. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2224 (1999) (reaffirming the test to abrogate state sovereign immunity set forth in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997)).
259. Congress is not required to expressly state that it enacts legislation pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983); Crawford v.
Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir. 1997). Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers
Congress to enforce any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to achieve its ends. See, e.g.,
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 789 (1966).
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Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity, notwithstanding the
nominal imprimatur of the Fourteenth Amendment, except perhaps
for legislation enacted under the Due Process Clause.
On its face, legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment must be rationally related to recognized Fourteenth
Amendment aims.26° However, bankruptcy is not connected to the
traditional Fourteenth Amendment purposes of preventing discrimi-
nation against individuals on the basis of suspect classifications like
race or gender.261 As noted above,262 some cases attempt to link section
106(a), through the Privileges and Immunities Clause,263 with
recognized Fourteenth Amendment aims. The better reasoned view,
however, is that bankruptcy is not a privilege or immunity of national
citizenship that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.26
Indeed, the Supreme Court has determined there is no constitutional
right to a bankruptcy discharge,265 one fundamental feature of the
federal bankruptcy laws.
More importantly, the Privileges and Immunities Clause has
been rendered of little use in this context due to the Supreme Court's
century-old decision in the Slaughter-House Cases, in which the Court
determined that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects only
rights "which owe their existence to the Federal government, its
National character, its Constitution, or its laws."266 The Court's list of
recognized privileges and immunities under that standard is very
260. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 532; Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1998);
Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 208 (6th Cir. 1996).
261. See Wilson-Jones, 99 F.3d at 210. A court must apply three factors to determine
whether a congressional enactment is pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: (1) whether the statute was enacted to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause; (2) whether it is "plainly adapted to that end"; and (3) whether it is consistent with the
"letter and spirit of the constitution." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
262. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
263. 'The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
264. See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 14; Kish v. Verniere (In re Kish), 212 B.R. 808, 817
(D.N.J. 1997) (holding that bankruptcy does not constitute a privilege or immunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and criticizing contrary cases for failing to consider, under the
"privileges and immunities" theory, whether section 106(a) was enacted for remedial or
preventive purposes). Moreover, in order to fall within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment,
bankruptcy itself would have to be a privilege or immunity because "the judiciary has
recognized that the 'privileges and immunities of national citizenship do not.., encompass the
right to have a federal question heard in a federal forum.'" In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 841
n.23 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (quoting Carr v. Axelrod, 798 F. Supp. 168, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
265. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973).
266. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873); see In re NVVR, L.P., 206
B.R. at 842.
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limited,27 and, notwithstanding the Court's recent decision in Saenz v.
Roe, the Court is unlikely to "discover" a new bankruptcy-related
right that falls within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
noted recently by a bankruptcy court:
Against such a backdrop, this court can conceive of no ground which might
warrant the "discovery" of a bankruptcy privilege in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Although the United States Department of Justice has referred to the
"right to obtain a fresh start" as belonging to the national citizenry ... no
authority has been cited as elevating that right to constitutional status.
268
Thus, legislation that merely reenacts section 106(a) with an express
statement that the stated abrogation of state Eleventh Amendment
and sovereign immunity is achieved pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment is unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny.269
The Velasquez v. FrapwelI27 case provides a good analogy. In
Velasquez, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA")2
71
was enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
permit suits against a state in federal court without running afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment.272 The court held that Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not provide the constitutional basis for
enacting USERRA because the statute was too remotely connected to
the policies of the Fourteenth Amendment.273 Courts probably would
267. These include: the right to become a citizen of the state in which a citizen of the
United States resides, see Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (1999); the right to take and hold
real property, see Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948); the right to carry on interstate
commerce, see Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 56 (1891); the right to be free from violence
while in the lawful custody of a United States marshal, see Logan v. United States, 144 U.S.
263, 266 (1892); the right to vote in national elections, see The Ku-Klux Cases, 110 U.S. 651, 664
(1884); the right to enter the public lands, see United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 79 (1884);
the right to petition Congress for redress of grievances, see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 552 (1875); the right to pass freely from state to state, see Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35, 49 (1867); and the right to inform federal officials of violations of federal law, see In re
Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 537 (1895).
268. In re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R. at 842.
269. Indeed, at least one court has warned that allowing Congress to enact bankruptcy law
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would "render Eleventh Amendment state
sovereign immunity meaningless and eviscerate the fundamental construct of federalism in our
constitutional form of government." In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1997).
270. Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1998).
271. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333 (1994).
272. See Frapwell, 160 F.3d at 391.
273. See id. (noting that military personnel are not members of a discrete or insular
minority)
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reach a similar result if Congress purported to reenact the Bank-
ruptcy Code under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although Congress cannot rely on the Equal Protection Clause
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a means of reenacting
section 106(a), the Florida Prepaid decision leaves some room for
Congress to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity for
bankruptcy purposes to further the protections guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In Florida Prepaid,
College Savings Bank was the owner of a patent for a methodology for
the financing of future college expenses.274 It brought suit against the
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board (the
"Board"), alleging the Board infringed upon College Savings Bank's
patent. 75 By the time College Savings Bank had brought its suit,
Congress had enacted the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act ('Patent Remedy Act"),276 which purported to
subject states to suit in federal court for infringements of patents.
277
The Board, which the Court concluded was an "arm of the State" of
Florida,278 asserted that congressional abrogation of its Eleventh
Amendment immunity was unconstitutional under Seminole Tribe.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the immunity
defense, reasoning that patents are property subject to the protections
of the Due Process Clause and that Congress's "objective in enacting
the Patent Remedy Act was permissible because it sought to prevent
states from depriving patent owners of this property without due
process."79 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals,
holding that the Patent Remedy Act was not legislation appropriately
enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In order for
legislation to be "appropriate" under Section 5, Congress "must
identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substan-
274. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199, 2201 (1999).
275. See id.
276. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h), 296(a) (1994).
277. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2223 (1999). Congress had passed the statute to meet the Atascadero requirement of a
"clear statement" of abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
278. In the companion College Savings Bank case, Justice Stevens, in dissent, disputes the
conclusion that the Board may assert sovereign immunity. Id. at 2233-34 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens argues that a state should not be able to assert sovereign immunity
where the state engages in "commercial activities." Id. at 2234.
279. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 148 F.3d
1343, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
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tive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or
preventing such conduct."280 The Patent Remedy Act failed to meet
Florida Prepaid's test because, in legislating the Act, Congress failed
to consider the availability of state remedies for patent infringement,
and the Act failed to detail a history of widespread and persisting
deprivation of property rights "of the sort Congress has faced in
enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation."281 This lack of informa-
tion made the abrogation provisions of the Patent Remedy Act " 'so
out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that
[they] cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior.' 282
But Florida Prepaid expressly accepts the proposition that
Congress can abrogate a state's sovereign immunity in order to
vindicate property rights protected under the Due Process Clause.
The Court stated: "if the Due Process Clause protects patents, we
know of no reason why Congress might not legislate against their
deprivation without due process under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.''283 Bankruptcy concerns property rights that are protected by
the Due Process Clause.28 Thus, Congress could re-enact the Bank-
ruptcy Code pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment if
Congress can show a widespread and persistent pattern of state
deprivations of property rights protected under the Bankruptcy Code.
Given the numerous times states have been found to violate the
automatic stay, one of many instances of potential state abuse, it
seems fairly simple for Congress to establish such a pattern.285
280. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199, 2201 (1999).
281. Id. at 2202.
282. Id. at 2210 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
283. Id. at 2208.
284. Although bankruptcy law does not create property rights, see, e.g., Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979), Abele v. Phoenix Suns Ltd. Partnership (In re Harrell), 73 F.3d
218, 219 (9th Cir. 1996), it does determine what is "property of the estate," 11 U.S.C. § 541
(1994), and provides protections against interference with estate property. See Id. §§ 362(a),
549(a). For example, welfare benefits may constitute "property of the estate." See Howell v.
Commonwealth of Penn., Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re Howell), 138 B.R. 484, 486 (W.D. Pa.
1992). The denial of welfare benefits under certain circumstances constitutes a violation of the
Due Process Clause. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). If a state asserts
sovereign immunity to a valid claim for welfare benefits in bankruptcy, it "deprives" the
claimant of the claimant's property rights without just compensation. See supra note 251; see
also Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc.), 156 B.R. 414, 436-37 (holding that causes of action are property of the estate).
285. Justice Stevens noted in dissent that the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990,
unlike the Patent Remedy Act, did include a study of state infringements of copyrights and
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Additionally, Congress could reenact section 1983 of title 42 to
provide for abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity. Such
abrogation would allow takings claims to proceed in federal court
against a state for money damages.286 Although a takings claim will
not lie if a state has provided a forum in state court, at least with
respect to the causes of action against states, like Maine, 287 that have
not waived sovereign immunity broadly or at all, some forum would
be provided for aggrieved bankruptcy parties.
B. Suing in the Name of the United States
Congress also could authorize suits against states by a United
States Trustee,2s or possibly by a private trustee or debtor-in-
possession, on behalf of the United States.289 Alden recognized that
potential state remedies. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2215, n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Congress could use such information to model similar Bankruptcy legislation. But see Alsbrook
v. City of Maumelle, No. 97-1825, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16945, *23-*28 (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 1999)
(holding that extensive legislative record alone did not suffice to bring title II of the Americans
with Disability Act under the umbrella of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment where
legislation goes beyond rational relationship standard and forces states to make modifications).
286. See Garrett v. Illinois, 612 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980).
287. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct 2240, 2268 (1999).
288. Meltzer believes that authorizing suit by the United States Trustee perhaps "would
alleviate the serious problems otherwise posed by Seminole for the administration of
bankruptcy." Meltzer, supra note 114, at 57 & n.264. Glauberman doubts whether Meltzer's
analysis is correct, noting that many bankruptcy suits arise under state law and questioning
whether Congress may authorize the United States to bring actions against states that do not
arise as federal causes of action. See Glauberman, supra note 117, at 104-06 & n.259.
289. This could work in at least two ways. First, the United States Trustee could sue a
state for bankruptcy causes of action held by the federal bankruptcy estate and not by any
private plaintiff. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965); United States v.
Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926) (holding that the state could not maintain an Eleventh
Amendment defense against a suit brought by the United States even though the suit was
brought for the benefit of a Native American tribe; however, under section 307 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the United States Trustee has standing to do so.) The important issue is
whether the United States has a sufficient interest in the suit to justify an elimination of a
state's Eleventh Amendment defense. The interest need not be a direct pecuniary interest. See
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375 (1923); United States v. University of N.M., 731
F.2d 703, 705 (10th Cir. 1984) (The United States may bring suit against a state as a trustee for
a Native American tribe in a trespass action.); Multi-district Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31
v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. (In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution), 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th
Cir. 1973) (holding that the United States may sue as parenspatriae to vindicate the interests of
its citizens.). On the other hand, the United States may not delegate its own power to sue a
state to a private party. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 783 (1991)
(dictum) (not permitting Native American tribes to sue in the name of the United States to
redress injury to the tribes.).
Second, within the constraints of Alden and Blatchford, Congress could authorize a private
party, like a chapter 7 trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession, to bring suits on behalf of the
United States. See Joseph F. Riga, State Immunity in Bankruptcy After Seminole Tribe v.
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suits brought in the name of the United States differ "in kind from
the suit of an individual."2® In fact, one court already has provided a
post-Seminole Tribe bankruptcy law roadmap for Congress to do so.
Specifically, in Department of Transportation and Development v.
PNL Asset Management Co. (In re Fernandez), the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit considered whether a judgment creditor, who had
acquired a judgment from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
('FDIC") and thereafter contested a state's title to property purchased
from the debtor, could step into the shoes of the United States to sue
the state in federal court.291
The court first noted that the "Eleventh Amendment does not
bar the United States government from filing suit in federal court
against a state.'292 However, the court ultimately held that the
judgment creditor's suit could not proceed because "a private succes-
sor to the FDIC cannot by implication enjoy the status accorded the
national government for Eleventh Amendment purposes. '293 Thereaf-
ter, in denying a petition for a rehearing, the Fifth Circuit noted that:
we are persuaded that there must be a clear expression of purpose to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment in any extension of agency status to a private party
for the purpose of jurisdiction. We find no such clarity of purpose [in section
106(a)] as required by the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe.
294
Although it is clear from the Fernandez decision that private
parties cannot merely step into the shoes of the federal government to
sue states at will, Congress probably could authorize bankruptcy
trustees and debtors-in-possession to bring suits based on federally
created bankruptcy claims for relief in the name of the United States
Florida, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 29, 59 (1997). Thus, the suits would have to assert claims for
relief created as a matter of federal bankruptcy law that do not belong to a private plaintiff.
Whether this proposal will avoid Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity depends on
whether courts will consider injury to a federally created bankruptcy estate to be injury to the
United States and whether the United States Trustee's supervisory authority over trustees and
debtors in possession constitutes sufficient government control over the litigation. See United
States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195, 202-03 (2d Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999) (holding that qui tam suits against States are not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment); infra notes 311-20 and accompanying text.
290. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
291. Department of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Management Co. (In re Fernandez), 123
F.3d 241, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1997), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1138-39 (5th Cir. 1997).
292. In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 245; 130 F.3d at 1138 (citing United States v. Mississippi,
380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965)). When states entered into the Union, they consented to be sued by the
United States. See id. 123 F.3d at 246; 130 F.3d at 1138.
293. Id. 130 F.3d at 1139 (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 1139 (emphasis added).
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as long as it made such authorization clear and unequivocal.295
Congress also likely would have to create a stronger nexus between
the United States Trustee and the private trustee, such as requiring
the United States to receive a percentage of any funds recovered from
a state.2 6 Indeed, Congress already has done so in the analogous
context of qui tam suits brought in the name of the United States. In
these suits, a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot be
asserted successfully.27 The qui tam statute presents a simple model
for Congress to follow:
A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person
and for the United States government. The action shall be brought in the
name of the Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and
295. See Janger, supra note 148, at 1438 (suggesting Congress could vest power in the
United States trustee to bring avoidance actions). Under current law, the private trustee or
debtor in possession stands in the shoes of all of the debtor's unsecured creditors, including the
United States when it is an unsecured creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1994). Under
Fernandez this statute might meet the requirement that the private trustee or debtor in
possession enjoys the status accorded the national government for Eleventh Amendment
purposes because section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code clearly and expressly abrogates
sovereign immunity with respect to section 544. Cf., e.g., Pate v. Hunt (In re Hunt), 136 B.R.
437, 450-51 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (holding that trustee's claim asserted on behalf of the
United States was not barred by the state statute of limitations since the trustee was
empowered to assert rights of the United States as a creditor); United States v. Gleneagles Inv.
Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 583 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Tabor Court Realty
Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986) (same). In our view it is unlikely, however, that the
Supreme Court would accord such a charitable construction to the Bankruptcy Code. Relying
on City of Boerne, the Court would probably hold that there is no clear statement that Congress
intended in section 544(b) to lend the name of the United States to abrogate immunity and
there is not a sufficient nexus between the United States and the private trustee to allow such a
suit. Moreover, even if congressional intent was clear, we think the Court would find delegation
of the power to sue in the name of the United States to transgress the constraints of Blatchford.
See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
296. See United States ex rel. Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d
195, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1998). Providing the United States a monetary incentive is not itself
dispositive, see supra note 295, but it would strongly favor an indication that the United States
is the real party in interest.
297. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 202-03; United States ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees, 104
F.3d 1453, 1458 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in qui
tam context); United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961
F.2d 46, 50 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. University of Mich., 860 F. Supp. 400, 404 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (dismissing on Eleventh Amendment grounds a retaliation suit brought by
individual against state pursuant to False Claims Act but noted that Eleventh Amendment
would not bar a private suit brought under main qui tam action.); Jonathan R. Siegel, The
Hidden Source of Congress's Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539,
550 (1995); Justin V. Switzer, Note, Did they really think this is over? Seminole Tribe v. Florida
and the Bankruptcy Code, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1243, 1275 (1999) (analogizing to qui tam actions).
But see Glauberman, supra note 117, at 102-04 (finding this analysis to be fatally flawed once it
is extended beyond traditional qui tam suits).
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the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons
for consenting.
298
In a qui tam suit, a private plaintiff may sue in the name of
the United States29 to seek civil damages for violation of the False
Claims Act. Under the False Claims Act, a person who makes a
false monetary claim to the United States government is liable to the
government for treble damages plus a $5,000-$10,000 civil penalty.301
The United States is given control over the litigation through the
power to intervene,32 settle,33 or terminate304 the suit. If the United
States does not intervene, the private plaintiff conducts the action,305
but any recovery belongs to the United States, subject to the right of
the private plaintiff to receive a percentage of the proceeds of the
suit.306
Delegating the power to sue in the name of the United States
to private parties is not without substantial criticism. Allowing
private parties to sue in the federal government's name in bank-
ruptcy, essentially for the purpose of circumventing Eleventh
Amendment and sovereign immunity, distorts the principles of
federalism by removing the states' constitutional protection against
non-consensual appearances in federal court.30 7 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, in recognizing the blatant end-run around the
298. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1994). However, qui tam actions might be distinguished from
bankruptcy actions on one important ground. Unlike qui tam actions, in bankruptcy, the
United States is often a creditor itself. Thus, one commentator has suggested that vesting
power in the bankruptcy trustee to bring suits in the name of the United States may create a
conflict of interest. See Janger, supra note 148, at 1440. But since the United States stands to
benefit from any recovery from the state that is distributed to creditors, the conflict is more
appearance than real.
299. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
300. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731.
301. See id. § 3729(a).
302. See id. § 3730(c).
303. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
304. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
305. See id. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
306. See id. § 3730(d).
307. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) ('The Eleventh Amend-
ment... serves to avoid the 'indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial
tribunals at the instance of private parties'.. .') (quoting Puerto Rico Aquaduct & Sewer Auth.
v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)); see also Siegel, supra note 297, at 558. Qui
tam actions, unlike bankruptcy, do not adversely affect federalism principles because such
actions directly vindicate the interests of the federal government. See Siegel, supra note 244, at
561 (delegating of authority to sue in the name of the United States should be permitted for qui
tam actions because they are "genuinely actions in which the United States is the plaintiff).
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Eleventh Amendment, held that the Eleventh Amendment bars qui
tam suits brought by private parties where the United States declines
to intervene.08 The court reasoned that when the federal government
takes a passive role in a qui tam action, "it is difficult to treat it as the
party that has 'commenced or prosecuted' the suit. 3°9 Moreover, the
qui tam statute does not contain the clear expression of abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity in its extension of agency status to
private parties.31
This issue should be resolved by the Supreme Court in the
October 1999 term. The Court granted certiorari to review the Second
Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. Stevens v. State of Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources.311 In Stevens, the plaintiff had filed a
qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging the Vermont
agency had made fraudulent claims against the United States.312 The
United States declined to intervene in the suit.33 The state agency
moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that that the state was not a
"person" within the meaning of the False Claims Act 314 and, more
importantly, the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit.315  The
majority opinion in Stevens concluded that the term "person" included
states within the meaning of the False Claims Act and further
decided that the Eleventh Amendment defense had no application.316
The court first noted that the states have no sovereign immunity as
308. United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir. 1999).
309. Id. at 291. The Foulds decision has placed the Fifth Circuit at odds with the Eighth
Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 1998),
cert. dismissed, 119 S. Ct. 2387 (1999), the Second circuit's decision in United States ex rel.
Stevens v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195, 201-03 (2d Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999), and the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States ex rel. Milam
v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46, 50 (4th Cir. 1992). The Foulds
decision rests on the notion that although the United States stands to recover, at minimum,
seventy percent of any recovery against a state and thus must be considered the "real party in
interest," the Eleventh Amendment will bar suit because it is the private party that invests
resources in bringing the suit and makes the day-to-day litigation decisions. Foulds, 171 F.3d at
293. ("With the merely chimerical presence of the United States in this case, the relator's
significant control over the litigation process plainly impinges on state sovereignty.').
310. See Foulds, 171 F.3d at 294.
311. United States ex rel. Stevens v. State of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162
F.3d 195, cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999).
312. See id. at 198.
313. See id. at 199.
314. The False Claims Act authorizes suits only against "persons" who defraud the federal
government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994).
315. See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 199.
316. See id. at 205.
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against the United States.317 The court then concluded that the False
Claims Act's statutory design indicates that the real party in interest
is the federal government, even in suits where the United States
declines to intervene.31 Thus, a private qui tam suit is still a cause of
action that belongs to the federal government 319 and the immunity
states enjoy must yield to it. Assuming that the Court does not
reverse Stevens, an assumption that is dubious in the current climate
of the balance of power between the federal government and the
states,320 then modeling the Bankruptcy Code after the False Claims
Act is constitutional and reasonably feasible.
C. Self-Executing Ex parte Young Injunction
As noted above,321 the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe
recognized that individuals may sue state officials for prospective
injunctive relief in federal court under the Ex parte Young doctrine as
long as Congress has not already crafted a "detailed remedial scheme!'
in the statute at issue.322 In Alden, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
vitality of the Ex parte Young doctrine.323 Accordingly, one additional
avenue that Congress should consider to ameliorate the effects of
Seminole Tribe in the bankruptcy context is the promulgation of a
statutory provision that automatically creates, on the date of the
filing of a bankruptcy petition, a standing injunction applicable to
state officials and proscribing the violation of federal bankruptcy
laws.324 Such an injunction could supplement and reinforce the
317. See id. at 201 (citing West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987)).
318. See id. at 202.
319. See id. at 203. Because the cause of action belongs to the federal government, the
Supreme Court's rule in Blatchford does not apply. See id.
320. Given this Court's makeup, we would not be surprised to find the Court agreeing with
the dissent's view in Stevens, which remarkably foretold many of the arguments expressed in
Alden, see id. at 211 (Weinstein, district judge, dissenting), that the qui tam suit against a state
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 229. But cf. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267
(1999). Justice Kennedy's opinion hinted that a suit brought in the name of the United States
overcomes sovereign immunity as long as the suit does not represent a "broad delegation to
private persons to sue nonconsenting States." Id. at 2267. Thus, the most promising course for
Congress should be to authorize suits against states by the United States trustee in the name of
the United States.
321. See supra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
322. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996).
323. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2263.
324. The Automatic Stay of section 362(a) already enjoins a state official who pursues the
state's interest as a prepetition creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). Section 362 is a
statutory injunction, equivalent to a court-ordered injunction, that arises without any court
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existing injunctive provisions of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which state that the commencement of a bankruptcy case
automatically operates as a stay of certain actions and conduct.35
Creating a standing Ex parte Young injunction would be
beneficial in at least three respects. First, it would save the bank-
ruptcy estate the litigation costs and the bankruptcy court system the
administrative costs that would be incurred in bringing a separate
proceeding for prospective injunctive relief against state officials at
the commencement of every case. Second, it could act as a deterrent
against willful violations of the Bankruptcy Code by a state, because
it would place state officials on notice that they could be held ac-
countable for such violations.326 Third, it would avoid litigation over
any existing ambiguity regarding the ability to bring Ex parte Young
actions in bankruptcy cases or proceedings.
At the very least, Congress should make clear in the Bank-
ruptcy Code its intent to authorize parties in interest from commenc-
ing Ex parte Young actions in bankruptcy courts to enforce some or all
of the provisions of the statute.
D. Conditional Claims Allowance
Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to allow a state's
claim for purposes of voting and distribution327 only if the state has
waived sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity
action. See, e.g., Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 620 (9th Cir.
1993); Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573, 1578 (11th Cir. 1992); Atkins v. Martinez (In re Atkins),
176 B.R. 998, 1004 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994) ('The automatic stay in bankruptcy comes into
existence as a matter of law; it is self-effectuating."); In re Xavier's, Inc., 172 B.R. 667, 672
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994). Although the stay is imposed by statute rather than court order,
courts have considered the statutory stay to be the equivalent of a court-ordered injunction.
Thus, section 362 provides a model for Congress for enacting a statutory injunction embodying
Exparte Young.
325. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) which arguably already serves this purpose.
326. Notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, state officials may be required to pay
money damages as "costs" for violating a court's equitable order. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 690-92 (1978). The Hutto Court reasoned that the cost of disobeying a federal court order is
ancillary to enforcement of federal law. See id. at 690. Thus, a state official who willfully
disobeys the automatic stay, or any other bankruptcy court order, may be held in contempt and
ordered to pay money damages to the aggrieved party.
327. In a chapter 11 case, a creditor may have a claim allowed for two separate purposes.
First, the claim may be allowed for purposes of voting on a plan of reorganization. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 502, 1111(a), 1126; FED. R. BANKR. P. 3018(a). Second, the claim may be allowed for
purposes of distribution even if the creditor was not permitted to vote on the plan. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(3), 1124.
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regarding the claim and compulsory counterclaims.328 Under current
law, the state may file a proof of claim which is deemed allowed
unless an objection is timely filed.329 As noted above,330 section 106(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code purports to deem the filing of a proof of claim
by the state to be a waiver of sovereign immunity regarding compul-
sory counterclaims.331 Some courts have questioned whether section
106(b) is unconstitutional. 332
Even if section 106(b) is impotent to waive state sovereign
immunity, Congress could amend section 502(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code333 to disallow a state's claim unless the state has waived Elev-
enth Amendment and sovereign immunity regarding the claim and
compulsory counterclaims. Under the Bankruptcy Clause of the
Constitution,",4 Congress has the power to enact uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States. Congress has
enacted a Bankruptcy Code that creates an estate comprised of all
property of the debtor on the date of the filing of a bankruptcy
petition335 It is solely within the province of Congress to determine
who has the right to share in the estate and the priority of distribu-
tion of the estate's assets.3 6  Congress could simply amend the
Bankruptcy Code to provide that if the state wants access to share in
the distribution of the estate, the state must agree, perhaps through
an act of its legislature, to surrender its immunity as the price of
admission. At least where the state holds an unsecured claim, there
should be no Constitutional impediment to the imposition of such a
condition.337
328. Based on his view that the constructive waiver doctrine is defunct and that Congress
cannot use its Article I power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, Glauberman sharply
disagrees that Congressional action of this kind will work. See Glauberman, supra note 117, at
87 (discussing conditional patent or copyright legislation). But Glauberman is more optimistic
about congressional legislation that would condition access to the bankruptcy court on the state
legislature's having passed a law waiving the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. at
87 n.145 (discussing possible copyright and patent legislation).
329. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 502(a).
330. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
331. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(b).
332. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
333. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (providing nine bases to disallow claims under current law).
334. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
335. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
336. See id. §§ 507(a), 726(a).
337. As stated above in note 187, the state may not assert a due process or takings defense
under the Fifth Amendment because the state is not a "person7 within the meaning of the
Amendment.
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E. Conditional Spending
Finally, as a last resort, Congress could encourage the waiver
of state Eleventh Amendment immunity through conditions to the
receipt of federal funds.
The Supreme Court has held that, pursuant to the Spending
Clause power,338 Congress may condition the receipt of federal funds
to "further broad policy objectives, ' 39 and Congress repeatedly has
used its Spending Clause power to condition receipt of federal funds
to influence states to regulate or act in a federally-desired manner.340
Presumably, Congress could require that states agree to waive their
Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to bankruptcy-related
actions in order to receive, for example, federal highway funds341
Although there are several limits to Congress's authority in
this regard, none would appear to prevent Congress from enacting
such a bankruptcy-related provision. The first such limitation is
found within the Spending Clause itself-exercise of the power must
be in pursuit of the "general Welfare.342 This limitation has little
substantive application, however, because the Supreme Court has
given substantial deference to the judgment of Congress regarding the
338. The Spending Clause provides that Congress has the power to 'lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay for the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
339. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980).
340. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987) (National Minimum Drinking Age
Act); Del A. v. Edwards, 855 F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir. 1988) (Adoptive Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980); Kit Kinsport, Implied Waiver After Seminole, 82 MINN. L. REV. 793, 822-23
(1998). In response to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded the scope of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause), President Clinton announced that the federal government
should "encourage states to ban guns from school zones by linking Federal funds to enactment
of school-zone gun bans." Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way to Retain Gun Ban in School
Zones, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at Al.
341. Kinsport discusses the general subject at some length and concludes that there is
nothing in the Eleventh Amendment that would bar such conditioning. See Kinsport, supra note
340, at 826. In particular, Kinsport notes that because the Eleventh Amendment itself
envisions the possibility of a waiver, "asking the states to exercise their waiver rights does not
require them to violate any 'independent constitutional bar.' " Id.; see Petty v. Tennessee-
Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1959) (finding a state's agreement in compact to
congressional condition subjected it to suit). Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit stated in Tennessee Department of Human Services v. United States Department of
Education, 979 F.2d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1992): "A state can waive its immunity explicitly when
it opts to participate in a federal program in which Congress clearly has conditioned participa-
tion on such waiver."
342. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
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nature of the "general Welfare."343 Thus, in the bankruptcy context,
Congress likely could justify use of its Spending Clause power to
further the goals of the Bankruptcy Code, which is a legal scheme
crafted in the interest of the general welfare.
344
A second limitation might arise from dictum that conditions on
federal funds "might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs.' 345 The
relationship between the conditions and the federal interest involved,
however, need only be reasonable, and there need not be a direct
relationship.346 Additionally, the relationship only needs to run
between the condition and the federal interest that is served; the
interest need not be related to the purpose of the funds.347 Condition-
ing waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to bank-
ruptcy matters clearly would be reasonably related to the important
federal interests in fostering a debtor's "fresh start" and a level
playing field for creditors, both of which would be enhanced by
eliminating a state's ability to secure a preferred position relative to
343. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. The "general Welfare" by its very terms includes a broad
range of activities and necessarily includes concerns beyond what the Constitution directly
grants Congress the power to legislate. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936)
(explaining that the spending clause power is not "limited by the direct grants of legislative
power found in the Constitution). The Court in Dole questioned whether the "general Welfare"
limitation is at all a judicially enforceable restriction on congressional power. Dole, 483 U.S. at
207 n.2; see also Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1929 (1995).
344. Dole instructs the courts to "defer substantially to the judgment of Congress" when
determining whether the first element of the Spending Clause test has been met. Dole, 483 U.S.
at 207.
345. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)).
346. The Supreme Court left this issue open in Dole. Id. at 208 n.3. Lower courts,
however, have consistently applied the reasonable relationship standard instead of the more
exacting direct relationship standard. See, e.g., California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092
(9th Cir. 1997).
347. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); see also Dole, 483 U.S. at
207; Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (upholding a condition
withholding highway funds from the states when a highway official violated the Hatch Act's
prohibition against participating in a political campaign). This distinction is subtle but
important. Consider the highway funds scenario. Bankruptcy has, at best, a very remote
relationship to highways. Congress, however, may use highway funds to further an unrelated,
constitutionally permissible interest. Thus, Congress could use highway funds to further the
federal interest in bankruptcy law (clearly a permissible interest under Article I of the U.S.
Constitution) as long as the condition imposed (a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity)
and the federal interest in bankruptcy are reasonably related.
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other creditors through the assertion of Eleventh Amendment or
sovereign immunity148
Third, the Supreme Court has noted "other constitutional
provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of
federal funds."349 This limitation, however, is designed to prevent
Congress from requiring states to engage in discriminatory treatment
of individuals on the basis of suspect classifications, engage in the
restriction of free speech or free exercise of religion, and the like. It
does not limit use of the Spending Clause to require a waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Specifically, courts have held that
although Congress may not use the Spending Clause power to require
states to engage in unconstitutional activity in order to receive federal
funds, it in fact may require a waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity as a condition to receipt of federal funds because such a
condition would not require the state to engage in any unconstitu-
tional activity (since states always are free to waive their Eleventh
Amendment immunity).350
States may argue that Congress exceeds its permissible use of
the Spending Clause power by "coercing" states into waiving their
Eleventh Amendment immunity in bankruptcy cases, and, in fact, the
Supreme Court has recognized that "in some circumstances the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to
pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' "351 The
348. But see Meltzer, supra note 114, at 55. Meltzer speculates that congressional
bankruptcy statutes abrogating sovereign immunity "are not now, and could not easily be,
associated with federal spending programs." Id.; see also Glauberman, supra note 117, at 108
n.274 (agreeing with Meltzer's proposition).
349. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
350. See Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997) ("One way for a state to
waive its immunity is to accept federal funds where the funding statute 'manifest[s] a clear
intent to condition participation in the programs funded under the Act on a State's consent to
waive its constitutional immunity.'" (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.234,
247 (1985)); Tennessee Dep't of Human Servs. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 979 F.2d 1162,
1166 (6th Cir. 1992); Beasley v. Alabama State Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d. 1304, 1314 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
("[E]ven the most expansive language in Seminole Tribe should not be read as curtailing
Congress's spending clause power to condition receipt of federal funds on states' waiver of their
sovereign immunity.).
351. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
Indeed, the state might argue that although Congress can encourage a state to adopt a new
program as a condition to receiving federal funds, it cannot require the state to relinquish a
property right or immunity as a condition to engaging in commerce. See Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2211 (1999) ("[We
think where the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the states' sovereign immunity is
involved, the point of coercion is automatically passed-and the voluntariness of waiver
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"coercion" theory, however, has not been used in any reported decision
as a reason for barring Congressional use of the Spending Clause
power.352  Additionally, a "coercion" theory makes little analytical
sense: "can a sovereign state which is always free to increase its tax
revenues ever be coerced by the withholding of federal funds-or is
the state merely presented with hard political choices?" 353 Recent
Supreme Court cases offer little further guidance. In Alden, the
Court, citing South Dakota v. Dole, stated: "[n]or, subject to constitu-
tional limitations, does the Federal Government lack the authority or
means to seek the states' voluntary consent to private suits." 354 Yet a
statement in College Savings Bank indicates the current Court's
uneasiness in allowing Congress to condition federal funding on
waiver of sovereign immunity. Justice Scalia stated: "we think where
the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the states' sovereign
immunity is involved, the point of coercion is automatically passed-
and the voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is attached to
the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the state from otherwise lawful
activity. 3ss  But Justice Scalia's statement should not affect Con-
gress's ability to condition federal funding on waiver of sovereign
immunity with respect to bankruptcy cases and proceedings. The
Court instead was distinguishing between the withholding of a gift or
gratuity of federal funds and exclusion from otherwise permissible
activity.356 Thus while the recent cases appear to breathe some life
into the "coercion theory," requiring states to waive immunity in
bankruptcy cases in order to receive federal funds should not result in
unconstitutional use of the Spending Clause power.
destroyed-when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from
otherwise lawful activity.).
352. See California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that no
party challenging the conditioning of federal funds has ever succeeded under the coercion
theory). Indeed, the Court in Dole noted that "coercion" theory would apply only in the most
extraordinary circumstances. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210-11.
353. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989).
354. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2276 (1999). The Court's reference to "constitutional
limitations" is merely a confirmation of the existing limits the Constitution places on the
Spending Clause power and does not add any new restrictions.
355. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2231 (1999).
356. "In the present case, however, what Congress threatens if the State refuses to agree to
its condition is not the denial of a gift or gratuity, but a sanction: exclusion of the State from
otherwise permissible activity." Id.
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States also may argue that the Tenth Amendment157 prohibits
Congress from "commandeering" states' legislative process "by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program."' 358 This argument similarly fails because the Tenth
Amendment "commandeering" theory does not apply to use of the
Spending Clause power to condition receipt of federal funds359
Congress, by reason of conditioned receipt of federal funds, does not
"commandeer" a state's legislation into waiving that state's Eleventh
Amendment or sovereign immunity. Instead, all that conditioning
does is present a state with a choice-either it can accept federal
funds and waive its Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity for
bankruptcy purposes, or it can decline the federal funds in order to
maintain its constitutional immunity.
F. Federalism Concerns
Although the options outlined above are constitutionally
permissible, we must ask whether the threats to bankruptcy law
caused by the Eleventh Amendment justify our prescriptions on policy
grounds. Given that Seminole Tribe and Alden establish a constitu-
tional right to sovereign immunity, a proper defense of the listed
options requires an analysis of federalism principles.6° We are
certain that despite the apparent harshness of some of our recom-
mended options, federalism justifies all of them.
Federalism is a subject that has occupied the attention of
lawyers, judges, scholars, and politicians since the earliest days of our
357. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
358. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
359. See id. at 168 ("By [use of the Spending Clause power], as by any other permissible
method of encouraging a State to conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the State
retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply."); Missouri v. United
States, 918 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996) ("Congress may hold out incentives to the State
as a method of influencing a State's policy choices ....'") (quoting New York v. United States,
505 U.S. at 165)).
360. Alden premised its decision in part on an appeal to federalism principles. Alden v.
Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2263-65 (1999); see also supra note 67 and accompanying text. We note
there is a marked lack of scholarship on bankruptcy law within the context of federalism. This
gap likely is attributable to the pre-Seminole Tribe absence of conflict between the federal
government and states over bankruptcy issues. We do not intend to transform this Article into
a lengthy discussion of federalism. Instead, we attempt only initially to defend on federalism




republic.361 Essentially, federalism concerns the allocation of power
between the federal government and the states. 62 But such a broad
definition offers little guidance unless the investigation is limited to
our narrow topic: whether federalism justifies congressional enact-
ments that specifically are designed to circumvent the Eleventh
Amendment's bar to the nonconsensual exercise of federal jurisdiction
against a state in bankruptcy court. We believe that federalism
provides such justification3
63
Before examining each 6f our proposed congressional solutions
on federalism grounds, it is helpful to note certain considerations that
guide the analysis. First, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, feder-
alism principles favor federal power if the Constitution generally
permits the federal government to engage in particular actions. 364 As
a corollary to the Supremacy Clause consideration, in areas of federal
economic policy-making, the justification for judicial restraint is
particularly strong.3 65 Congress is granted preemptive authority to
enact bankruptcy laws.366 Thus, even if the new constitutional
sovereign immunity, as applied in Seminole Tribe and Alden, prevents
Congress from using its Article I power to abrogate the states'
constitutional immunity in bankruptcy, other constitutional methods
that achieve the same result should be favored.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions undercut our conclusion
to some extent. Alden elevates common law sovereign immunity to a
constitutional status that trumps the use of Article I power. Florida
Prepaid restricts the use of the Due Process Clause to overcome
constitutional sovereign immunity. College Savings Bank eliminates
361. See Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1295, 1299 (1997).
362. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1219, 1220 (1997).
363. Because appearing in state courts to enforce bankruptcy rights would undercut the
policy of uniformity and is a practice most bankruptcy practitioners would care to avoid, our
policy discussion is limited to abrogating immunity to suit in federal court. Nevertheless, the
inability to sue states in state courts undercuts traditional bankruptcy jurisdiction that allows
the estate's representative to sue in state courts. See 11 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994).
364. A clear example of this consideration is the Court's venerable decision in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819). There the Court held that a Maryland tax on the
National Bank of the United States violated Congress's power to legislate under the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Particular to our inquiry, Justice Marshall stated that "congress should
exercise its discretion as to the means by which it must execute the powers conferred upon it."
Id. at 326.
365. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Essay, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism:
The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2220 (1996).
366. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195-96 (1819); supra notes 97-
101 and accompanying text.
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the implied waiver doctrine. All three cases must be interpreted as a
triumph of states' rights.17  But the Court did not reject the well-
grounded theory that federalism favors federal power if that power is
lawfully exercised, even if the purpose of the use of lawful power is to
diminish the states' sovereign immunity.368 The Court carefully
recognized the limitations on sovereign immunity and noted that the
states are bound to follow federal law.
Second, the traditional justifications for protecting states on
federalism grounds have little application to bankruptcy law. These
traditional concerns include the "indignity of subjecting a state to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private
parties,"369 fear of the tyranny of the federal government, 370 the states'
better ability to respond to its citizens' needs,371 and the benefit of
having states act as laboratories for social and economic change.32 To
the extent such justifications are legitimate,373 none affect bankruptcy.
367. See Joan Biskupic, Justices, 5-4, Strengthen State Rights, WASH. POST, June 24, 1999,
at Al.
368. The Court's affirmation of the principles of Ex parte Young and Dole indicates
approval.
369. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887); see Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,
287-88 (1997).
370. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 525 (1995).
The Lopez decision reasoned that if Congress could enact a law banning guns around schools on
Commerce Clause grounds, then Congress could fairly justify a law regulating school
curriculum on the same theory. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995). Implicit
in this reasoning is the fear that Congress's regulation of local school curricula is an exercise of
tyrannical federal power. Fear of federal power has roots extending to earliest years of the
United States, see Weinberg, supra note 361, at 1302-03 (noting that the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions were a response to the Sedition Act of 1798), and has provided a powerful platform
for electoral candidates. See Hovenkamp, supra note 365, at 2221.
371. See Chemerinsky, supra note 370, at 527.
372. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis stated:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial
of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.
Id.
373. George Washington once stated: 'To be fearful of vesting Congress, constituted as that
body is, with ample authorities for national purposes, appears to me the very climax of popular
absurdity and madness." Weinberg, supra note 361, at 1299 (quoting Letter from George
Washington to John Jay (Aug. 15, 1786) in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF
JOHN JAY 207-08 (Henry P. Johnson ed., 1970)). The reliance on federalism to favor states'
rights has, on numerous occasions throughout American history, produced terrible results.
Before the Civil War, southern legislators consistently relied upon notions of federalism to
defend the institution of slavery. See id. at 1301. Federalism and the protection of the states
was invoked to defeat national labor laws. See Hovenkamp, supra note 365, at 2213-14. During
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There cannot be fear of federal tyranny by the mere creation of a
neutral forum for marshaling, sorting through, and distributing a
debtor's assets. Moreover, preventing a suit against a state in
bankruptcy court does not further a state's responsiveness to its
citizens. And because bankruptcy is the paramount domain of
Congress, state insolvency laws are superseded by any federal
bankruptcy law.374 Thus, the benefit of states as laboratories for social
and economic development simply does not exist in the bankruptcy
context.375 Last, the argument that states ought not be subject to the
indignity of the coercive process, while bandied about by the current
majority of the Supreme Court in a slew of cases, has little merit in
American jurisprudence3 7s
Third, states have the ability to protect their interests in
bankruptcy both inside the courthouse and in Congress. States
already receive some preference in bankruptcy.377 States also have a
the Civil Rights Movements of the 1950s and 1960s, the principles of federalism were
consistently paraded by the southern states in their attempts to defeat desegregation and
implementation of the Voting Rights Act. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323
(1966). In a challenge to a provision of the Voting Rights Act that required all voting changes by
covered states to be "precleared" by the United States Department of Justice, South Carolina
premised its attack on federalism grounds. See id. Justice Black, in concurring and dissenting
in the case, echoed South Carolina's argument:
[The Voting Rights Act], by providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or
adopt state constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg federal
authorities to approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of govern-
ment as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and federal
power almost meaningless.
Id. at 358 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); see also SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION:
THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 19-20 (1993). In each case the rhetoric of
federalism was used to hide the desire of the states to continue repugnant practices.
374. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 195-96 (1819).
375. See Chemerinsky, supra note 370, at 539 (noting that the National Labor Relations
Act's weaknesses have led states to enact laws that better guarantee fair working conditions for
all employees). If anything, changes in the national economy require flexibility and experimen-
tation at the national level, which counsel for more deference to federal decision-making. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 365, at 2221.
376. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2289 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter aptly noted that the theory of "dignity" as a justification for state sovereign immunity is
anomalous to a republican form of government. See id. The very concept of sovereign immunity
has its roots in separating the royal from his subjects. See id. Under the American form of
government, the people are the government. See id.
377. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1994) (automatic stay apparently does not apply to a
governmental unit's commencement or continuation of a proceeding to enforce the governmental
unit's police or regulatory power); id. § 503(b)(1)(B) (administrative expense priority for certain
types of tax claims); id. § 507(a)(8) (some unsecured pre-petition tax claims entitled to priority
ahead of general unsecured creditors).
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unique lobbying power at the national level that safeguards their
autonomy and insures that Congress does not abuse its power.3 78
Fourth, there is a strong, uniquely national, interest in
bankruptcy379 and a specific national interest in the bankruptcy court
as a neutral forum.380 As we stated in the introduction, bankruptcy
provides resolution to competing claims that often cross state lines.
The Court's apparent disregard in Florida Prepaid for the national
interest in patent law uniformity, as a justification for overcoming
sovereign immunity, must cause some concern for bankruptcy
advocates, but even in Florida Prepaid the Court accepted the basic
premise that patent law needs to be uniform in order to be effective.81
Armed with these considerations3 82 we examine whether the
options available to Congress may be justified. We begin with the
easiest suggestion-the enactment of the self-executing Ex parte
Young injunction. As mentioned above, Congress could amend the
Bankruptcy Code to provide for a standing Ex parte Young injunction.
Such an enactment would promote bankruptcy interests by saving
private and public litigation costs and deterring state officials from
willfully violating Bankruptcy Code provisions. In light of the
federalism principles we discuss, clearly such a provision favors
federal power. Ex parte Young provides for the supremacy of federal
law.383 It applies only to prospective injunctive relief claims and thus
does not directly affect a state's treasury. And such an enactment
378. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1103, 1163 (1987). The "political safeguards" theory is not without its critics. See
Baker, supra note 343, at 1940; H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially
Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 911-12 (1999). Moulton does concede that the
"political safeguards" theory at least "rightly focuses attention on the fact that most of the hard
work of allocating responsibility among levels of government happens outside the courtroom."
Id. at 913.
379. The national interest in uniform bankruptcy laws has been recognized for over two
hundred fifty years. See Sturges, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 124 ("[Cqongress only can make laws on
the subject of bankruptcies. It is a national subject....').
380. See Elizabeth Warren, Why Have a Federal Bankruptcy System?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1093, 1094-95 (1992). A bankruptcy court is not only beneficial as a neutral forum for debtors
and creditors, but by virtue of its federal character, it prevents the need to resort to state courts
to vindicate national interests. See Chemerinsky, supra note 362, at 1229. James Madison once
stated: "Confidence cannot be put in State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and
interests." Id. (quoting 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 27 (1913)).
381. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199, 2209 (1999).
382. We by no means assume our list is exhaustive. Considerations governing federalism
no doubt span well beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 360.
383. See Chemerinsky, supra note 362, at 1228.
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would significantly deter state officials from willfully abusing the
automatic stay, thereby helping to maintain the level playing field
among creditors.
Amending the Bankruptcy Code to disallow a state's claim
unless it waives immunity with respect to the claim and compulsory
counterclaims that may be asserted against a state also respects
federalism principles. It is perfectly reasonable to require a state, the
one kind of creditor that can assert an Eleventh Amendment and
sovereign immunity, to surrender those defenses in order to partici-
pate in a federal bankruptcy res. Such a prescription restores the
level playing field bankruptcy requires in order to fulfill its purpose.
And the state's invocation of federal jurisdiction to vindicate its claim
should distinguish our proposal from the Court's attack on involun-
tary waivers in College Savings Bank.3 84
The last three options appear to be more difficult to justify on
federalism grounds. Reenacting the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to the
Due Process Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment sets
a potentially dangerous precedent3s5 Any federal program enacted
pursuant to Article I might be made to apply to the states through the
Due Process Clause, assuming that Congress could satisfy the
conditions that the Court set in Florida Prepaid.386 However, the
resolution of property rights in bankruptcy has direct connections to
legitimate due process concerns.3 17 Moreover, the rate of state abuse
of the bankruptcy laws is something Congress easily can catalog and
present as evidence of a continuing and pervasive pattern of state
violations of the Due Process Clause. Thus, although concerns that
Congress could stretch the Fourteenth Amendment exception to
384. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2231 (1999) ("We think where the constitutionally guaranteed protection of the States'
sovereign immunity is involved, the point of coercion is automatically passed-and the
voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the
exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity.").
385. As explained above, re-enacting the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendments Privileges and Immunities Clause and Equal Protection Clause likely exceeds the
scope of Congress's power. But see Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1526-27 (1999) (arguably
breathing new life into the privileges and immunities clause).
386. See Department of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Management Co. (In re Fernandez),
123 F.3d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1997), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1138 (5th Cir. 1997).
387. The Due Process Clause prohibits the deprivation of "life, liberty or property without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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tyrannical levels are noteworthy, cloaking bankruptcy with the
protections of the Due Process Clause is justified.388
Our fourth option, conditional receipt of federal funds, does not
have the grandeur of the Due Process Clause. And despite its
continued constitutional vitality,389 conditional spending has been
attacked routinely by critics of federal power.39 Conditioning a state's
receipt of federal funds on waiver of the Eleventh Amendment and
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy smacks of dirty politicking391 and
blatant intimidation by the federal government. The Spending Clause
power works only when Congress makes the receipt of federal funds
388. Even easier than reenacting the entire Bankruptcy Code pursuant to the Due Process
Clause, a congressional amendment to section 1983 of title 42 to abrogate sovereign immunity,
thus providing bankruptcy parties potential takings claims, is clearly defensible on federalism
grounds. The Fifth Amendment already bars the federal government from asserting sovereign
immunity to takings claims. See Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 13 (1933). There is
nothing in the nature of state sovereign immunity that distinguishes it from federal sovereign
immunity for purposes of the Fifth Amendment as made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
389. The 1990s are rife with Supreme Court opinions, beyond the Eleventh Amendment
cases, supporting states' rights at the expense of limiting federal power, see, e.g., Alden v.
Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2268-69 (1999) (Fair Labor Standards Act cannot abrogate state
sovereign immunity from suit in state courts); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210-11 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act invalidly abrogates state sovereign immunity under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (The Gun Free
School Zones Act exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (federal law regulating low-level radioactive waste violated the
Tenth Amendment because it coerced state legislative and regulatory regimes); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (Congress may regulate the retirement age of state judges
only by clear language). One would reasonably think that the Spending Clause cases would be
an inviting target for the Supreme Court. Yet Chief Justice Rehnquist was the author of the
majority opinion in Dole, and Justice Scalia recognized its vitality as an exception to construc-
tive waiver of sovereign immunity in College Savings Bank. College Sav. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2231 (1999).
390. These attacks have focused on the lack of constraints on the Spending Clause power
and the inability of states to protect themselves from Congress. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 343,
at 1933; Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan
Horse, 1988 SuP. CT. REV. 85, 87 (1988).
391. Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent in FERC v. Mississippi that "[c]ongressional
compulsion of state agencies.., blurs the lines of political accountability and leaves citizens
feeling that their representatives are no longer responsive to local needs." FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 787 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The point Justice O'Connor makes is that
the federal government can insulate itself from political accountability by influencing the states
to enact legislation that the state's citizens may not in fact want (highway speed limits) in order
to receive federal funds. Even if Justice O'Connor's point has merit, it only works if in fact state
citizens would care about the state's surrender to federal influence. It seems doubtful that state
citizens would generate hostility or offer any opinion on whether a state waives its Eleventh
Amendment immunity and consents to be sued in federal court.
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irresistible.392 Moreover, it must be conceded that the Eleventh
Amendment defense in bankruptcy is difficult to connect with federal
funds.393
Yet the power of Congress to influence decision making at the
state level through the Spending Clause clearly supports federalism
principles. Congress itself is made up of representatives of the states.
Congressional members are not immune to the pressures from home
to protect specific state interests391 Thus, the states can, in some
measure, protect themselves against abusive federal conditioning.395
Moreover, the actual harm to a state in surrendering its constitu-
tional sovereign immunity in bankruptcy is "more rhetoric than
fact.' '39s Finally, because bankruptcy is an area of federal economic
regulation,397 Congress must be given more deference to promote
bankruptcy goals, including, if necessary, conditioning receipt of
federal funds on waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity and
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy.
Last, we consider whether authorizing private trustees or
debtors in possession to sue in the name of the United States offends
or supports federalism principles. Unlike the other solutions, lending
the name of the United States to a private party causes a direct
confrontation between the federal government and the states.
392. See William Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver" for the Rights of Your People, 16
HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoLy 303, 319-20 (1993). States substantially rely upon federal funding to
support a wide array of projects. See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 390, at 86.
393. For example, receipt of education funds on the condition that states enact gun-free
zone laws or receipt of highway funds as a condition of raising minimum drinking ages are
logically connected. Justice O'Connor, in her dissent in Dole, argued for a rule that required
Congress to show a more than attenuated or tangential connection between the federal funds
being offered to a state and the federal program in which Congress wishes the states to
participate. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213-15 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). It
is reasonable to believe that a few retirements of current Supreme Court Justices could elevate
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dole to majority status.
394. Public choice theory states that most regulatory schemes are enacted to promote the
interests of particular groups. See Hovenkamp, supra note 365, at 2217. There is no reason
why states cannot lobby for self-interested legislation as effectively as a manufacturing lobby,
trial lawyers, or the American Association of Retired Persons. See infra note 395.
395. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559
(1954); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 365, at 2221. As Wechsler notes, national level
politicking "is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center
on the domain of the states." Wechsler, supra at 558. Not all commentators accept Wechsler's
"political safeguards" theory. See Moulton, supra note 378, at 911-12.
396. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. As noted above, supra note 391, state citizens likely do not care
whether the Eleventh Amendment is waived as a condition to receipt of federal funds.
397. See Hovenkamp, supra note 365, at 2220.
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Assuming arguendo the constitutionality of such a gambit, such
authorizations solve the problem of Seminole Tribe and Alden only
because the Eleventh Amendment must yield to the supremacy of the
federal government when the federal government directly confronts a
state.
Yet there is a flaw in authorizing private trustees to sue in the
name of the United States such that federalism principles suggest
abandoning this option. The Supreme Court likely would conclude
that the federal government's interest in bankruptcy estates repre-
sented by private trustees or debtors-in-possession is at best remote.
This is distinguished from qui tam suits where the favorable resolu-
tion of the suit in fact benefits the United States directly.398 The
direct benefit to the federal government in qui tam actions justifies
lending the federal government's power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity.399
If the "suing in the name of the United States" statute is
tailored such that the United States stands to benefit from any
bankruptcy recovery, however, then federalism favors such a provi-
sion. Moreover, if the United States trustee exercises governmental
discretion whether to prosecute the action on behalf of the estate in
the name of the United States, then federalism concerns evaporate.
Alden recognized that the states' constitutional sovereign immunity
right must yield to suits brought by the federal government; in fact,
one point of contention between the majority and the dissenters was
on the likelihood of the federal government actually bringing suits to
enforce federal law.4°° Both the Alden majority and Justice Souter, in
debating the likelihood of federal intervention in Fair Labor Standard
Act suits, implicitly accept the notion that federalism principles favor
suits against states in federal court where the United States stands to
benefit.401 Thus, granting trustees in bankruptcy cases the right to
sue in the name of the United States in order to partially recover for
the United States should be preferred.
398. See United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 290 (5th Cir. 1999);
see also supra note 306 and accompanying text.
399. Amending the Bankruptcy Code to require the estate to distribute a percentage of any
recovery to the United States treasury may solve this problem. The fees to which the United
States Trustee is entitled in 28 U.S.C. § 1930 probably are insufficient to create a nexus
between a private trustee and the United States because those fees are generated in every
bankruptcy case, not just in suits against a state.





The Supreme Court's decisions in Seminole Tribe and Alden
render section 106(a) of the ,Bankruptcy Code unconstitutional as
applied to its abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment and
sovereign immunity. Congress, though providing the necessary
unequivocal intent to abrogate the states' immunity, failed to abro-
gate states' immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of power because
the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I is not a source of legislative power
that may abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Bankruptcy courts cannot save section 106(a) by applying the
Fourteenth Amendment exception to the Eleventh Amendment
because there is no legal basis to view bankruptcy as a privilege or
immunity of national citizenship. Nor will the Takings Clause be
available as long as section 1983 of title 42 does not abrogate sover-
eign immunity. But, subject to the constraints of Boerne and Florida
Prepaid, Congress might be able to reenact section 106 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to address Fourteenth Amendment Due Process issues,
at least to the extent states act intentionally to seize or destroy
property of the estate. Except for possible Due Process redress, it
appears that a bankruptcy court may not exercise jurisdiction over a
state absent the state's consent or waiver of Eleventh Amendment
and sovereign immunity.
Although Seminole Tribe and Alden have significant adverse
effects for enforcing bankruptcy law against states, trustees or
debtors-in-possession still have a variety of limited options at their
disposals. Governmental units that are not arms of the state, such as
counties and cities, may not invoke Eleventh Amendment protections
successfully. Trustees may still sue state officials for prospective
injunctive relief pursuant to the Ex parte Young doctrine. And, there
may be a limited in rem "exception" to the Eleventh Amendment in
the bankruptcy context.
But these limited options provide no relief to debtors and
creditors in cases such as Tri-City Turf Club, described in this
Article's introduction. To provide meaningful resolution to the
problems caused by Seminole Tribe and Alden, Congress should
amend the Bankruptcy Code to further the policies of bankruptcy law.
Congress might achieve this goal in several ways. First, Congress
could amend the Bankruptcy Code to authorize the United States
trustee, and possibly private trustees or debtors in possession, to sue
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states in the name of the United States. Second, Congress could
amend the statute to provide for a standing, self-executing Ex parte
Young injunction against state officials. Third, Congress could
condition a state's claim to bankruptcy proceeds on a waiver of
Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity. Fourth, Congress
could resort to the Spending Clause power to condition a state's
receipt of federal funds on a waiver of Eleventh Amendment and
sovereign immunity.
Although these potential legislative enactments either have a
limited scope or cause uneasiness with respect to notions of federal-
ism,402 they are desirable to remedy the potentially devastating effect
of Seminole Tribe, Alden, and their progeny in bankruptcy cases and
proceedings.
402. See Rosenthal, supra note 378, at 1133.
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